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 Executive Summary 
Although numerous definitions of corruption might be found in the literature, 
depending on the focus of a particular study, there is convergence on a basic 
definition that understands corruption as the abuse of public power for private benefit. 
This definition is broad enough to encompass all types of corruption one encounters in 
reality. It also places the public sector at the center of the phenomena of corruption. 
This report uses this definition of corruption. Corruption flourishes where there is no 
check on the discretionary powers of bureaucrats and where politicians are not held 
accountable to the citizens. In other words, corruption typically occurs where there is an 
opportunity for an exchange of resources and services that can be kept covert. 
Corruption occurs in the context of systems that create opportunities for corrupt 
behavior. Therefore, when searching for the sources of corruption it is necessary to 
focus not on corrupt individuals, but on corrupt systems. Corruption brings 
substantial economic, social and moral costs to the society affected by it. 
Essentially, the costs caused by corruption are the reason why corruption 
should be fought against. 
 
In order to achieve the ultimate goal of this research, namely to propose methods for 
curbing public-sector corruption with the help of information and communication 
technologies (ICTs), it is necessary to distinguish between different types of corruption. 
There are various types of corruption and not all of them can be successfully fought 
against with the help of ICTs. The first group of corrupt practices is formed by petty 
bureaucratic corruption (i.e. low-level administrative corruption). The second 
group of corrupt activities consists of the strategies aimed at self-serving asset 
stripping by state officials. The third group of corrupt activities is formed by great 
political corruption.  
 
If an anticorruption strategy is to be viable, it must be designed as a multi-pronged 
endeavor that includes a set of complex measures in different spheres of society and 
state organization. More specifically, one needs to define all dimensions of the 
anticorruption struggle and the role ICTs can play in it. In order to fight 
corruption one needs to focus on three distinctive aspects – (1) corruption 
opportunities; (2) corruption incentives, i.e. salaries; and (3) the likelihood of detection 
and punishment of corrupt activities, i.e. policing. A successful anticorruption strategy 
should incorporate all the three dimensions. Thus, it has to (1) specify methods for 
minimizing corruption opportunities via increased transparency; (2) diminish 
corruption incentives through putting in place a stable system of civil service, 
including clearly defined career prospects and a system of remuneration, and (3) 
increase the probability of detection of corrupt activities, i.e. develop concrete 
control mechanisms. This report touches upon all the three aspects of the anticorruption 
effort. However, it primarily focuses on minimizing corruption opportunities, as it 
is this dimension where ICTs hold the biggest potential for promoting the 
anticorruption effort.  
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 All types of petty bureaucratic corruption can be powerfully diminished through the 
increased transparency achieved by using modern electronic media. Generally, the 
employment of the Internet in the administrative proceedings in all fields of public 
administration brings more transparency; therefore, it minimizes the opportunities for 
public officials to monopolize access to relevant information and to extract bribes from 
their clients. Petty corruption can be substantially curbed by the employment 
of ITCs. Further, the employment of ICTs can also powerfully foster the 
anticorruption struggle against self-serving asset stripping by state officials. 
Last but not least, the employment of ICTs may also play an important role in 
preventing some types of grand political corruption. 
 
Electronic media not only directly help curb public-sector corruption by increasing the 
transparency of the political and administrative systems, but can also facilitate the 
activities and cooperation of the actors focused on fighting corruption. As corruption 
flourishes when there is a monopoly of power (usually on the side of state 
bureaucrats), it is vital that actors other than the state officials get involved in the 
anticorruption campaign. Therefore, it is the activities of nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) and media independent of the state that are vital in keeping 
the engine of the anticorruption struggle going. In this respect, ICTs can enhance the 
involvement of diverse actors representing various social interests so as to (1) de-
monopolize the anticorruption effort; and (2) to enable various actors to obtain 
information about the activities of other actors. This holds the potential of increasing the 
transparency of the whole system without concentrating the power of control in the 
hands of a single institutional actor such as the state. This strategy fully utilizes the 
potential of the ICTs. It aims at a decentralized model of corruption control and 
therefore, preempts the mismanagement of information technology by asymmetrically 
empowered actors such as the state or municipal bureaucrats. 
 
Although the employment of ICTs should ultimately contribute to a more decentralized 
organization of public administration, their introduction needs an agency to coordinate 
the activities of all involved actors. Therefore, the recent establishment of the Czech 
Ministry of Informatics is the concrete response to this demand. However, the 
employment of ICTs for curbing public-sector corruption has not yet found 
the way to the agenda of the new institution. In view of the demonstrated 
opportunities for the use of electronic tools in the anticorruption fight, this is 
regrettable. The Ministry of Information should without delay start cooperation with 
the Ministry of Interior which is primarily responsible for the preparation and 
fulfillment of the governmental anticorruption strategy. Presently, in the CR the 
anticorruption strategy does not pay any attention to the employment of ICTs. The 
coordinated effort of the two ministries should bring the issue to the 
political agenda and stimulate cooperation with other central offices of 
public administration and ministries such as the Ministry of Justice. The 
employment of ICTs must be incorporated into the governmental strategy 
for curbing corruption. Policy recommendations for the employment of ICTs in 
the anticorruption campaign in the CR are specified as follows: 
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 1. In cooperation with the Ministry of Informatics the Ministry of Interior should 
prepare a conception for publicizing all administrative rules, procedures, 
and requirements on the Internet. No area of public administration should 
be characterized by over-regulation and disorganization. Presently, the situation 
in some fields of public administration is highly opaque. This diminishes the 
effectiveness of public administration and creates opportunities for 
corruption.  
2. In cooperation with the Ministry of Justice the Ministry of Informatics should 
prepare a pilot project for the employment of a web application that would 
provide information about the development of court cases, including all main 
events such as court hearings, appeal and referral of cases, results from a higher 
instance. This information system should be introduced into a selected 
county court in the CR. This would introduce a mechanism that could prevent 
unsubstantiated delays of court decisions. The record of every case would be 
publicly accessible through the Internet, including the record of names of the 
individuals responsible for concrete decisions.  
3. In cooperation with the Ministry of Informatics the Ministry of Interior should 
prepare a program of training based on international experience and designed 
for policemen and members of specialized anticorruption units that 
operate in the CR. The training should be focused on the possibilities for using 
ICTs in the investigative and monitoring activities of the police and other 
investigative and law enforcement agencies.  
4. In order to utilize the potential ICTs hold for making public procurement 
more transparent, the Ministry of Informatics in cooperation with the Office 
for the Protection of Economic Competition should work out a methodology 
that would allow not only for publicizing biding opportunities on the 
Internet, but also for organizing the tenders themselves electronically. 
The present system provides information about public tenders; however, it is not 
possible to organize full-fledged e-tenders. If e-tendering were introduced it 
would enable wider range of interested bidders to take part in tenders and it could 
also challenge the presently entrenched firms which artificially increase prices of 
public contracts.  
5. In order to achieve at least a minimal control over parliamentary lobbying the 
Ministry of Interior should prepare a legal norm on the obligatory registration 
of lobbyists. The list of the registered lobbyists should be made public through the 
Internet. The list should also contain the record of lobby activities of the 
recognized lobbyists.  
6. The Ministry of Interior should prepare an amendment of the relevant legal 
norm that would make the publication of political parties’ annual reports on the 
Internet a compulsory requirement for obtaining public funding. This 
measure should be accompanied by related measures in the form of an 
auditing institution that would focus on controlling revenues and 
expenditures of political parties and legal limits put on possible types 
of private donors. 
 
The employment of ICTs can bring more transparency into public administration and 
politics. Also, increased transparency will have a tangible effect on corruption only if it is 
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 accompanied by measures in two other dimensions of anticorruption struggle - 
minimizing corruption incentives, i.e. introducing a stable system of remuneration 
and career prospects for public servants and improving policing, i.e. increasing the 
probability that corrupt activities will be disclosed. Strengthened control 
mechanisms and strict penalty provisions should become important 
components of any successful anticorruption strategy: 
 
1. In cooperation with the Police Directorate the Ministry of Interior should 
prepare a method for police investigation focused on cases of great political 
corruption. The goal of this recommendation is to increase the probability of 
disclosure of corrupt politicians at the central as well as municipal levels.   
2. The Ministry of Interior should prepare a proposal that would ensure that 
those ministerial departments and areas of public administration that 
are vulnerable to corrupt activities (e.g. customs, departments that organize 
big public tenders, traffic police) are regularly exposed to audits of their internal 
procedures by monitoring and law enforcement agencies.   
 
Last but not least, one of the most emphasized dimensions of the anticorruption struggle 
is the strengthening of civil society participation. In order to facilitate the 
activities of the NGOs working on corruption in the CR: 
 
1. The recently reinvigorated cooperation between the organizations working on 
corruption should continue.  
2. As the policy of openness and responsiveness to the relevant state offices has not 
yet brought any tangible results in terms of the substantially diminished 
levels of corruption in the CR, all anticorruption NGOs should take a 
relatively tougher stance on corruption. Within the confines of the 
valid legal norms the corrupt politicians and bureaucrats should be 
directly confronted.  
3. Transparency International – a leading anticorruption NGO in the CR - should 
take a more active stance in the anticorruption campaign. Based on the 
experience of other national chapters of Transparency International (e.g. 
Bulgaria) it should employ the strategy of direct monitoring of big 
governmental deals (public tenders). In addition, the recent auctions of 
private sector’s debts by the Czech Consolidation Agency provide an opportunity 
for the active involvement in the anticorruption struggle.  
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 I. Introduction 
This research report summarizes the findings of a research on corruption and the 
possible employment of information and communication technologies 
(ICTs) in curbing it. The introductory parts of the report focus on the employment of 
ICTs against corruption in general; however, the core of the paper concentrates on 
corruption and ICTs in the Czech Republic (CR). The main findings of the research 
are followed by policy recommendations; hence, the motivation and the goal of all 
recommendations are presented against the background of the assessment of the 
present situation. The presented recommendations are formulated in a way that 
makes them applicable also in other East European countries.  
 
In order to better specify methods for the use of ICTs against corruption, the report first 
classifies corruption in Eastern Europe (section III). Subsequently, the report generally 
defines how ICTs can be employed in order to fight some types of corruption (section 
IV). Further, the report precisely specifies how to use ICTs against corruption in the CR 
(section VII). At the same time, the report indicates that ICTs cannot mitigate corruption 
automatically. ICTs can be powerfully employed against some types of corrupt 
activities. Essentially, the employment of ICTs increases the transparency of the 
system (e.g. the state) that employs them. However, the fight against corruption 
consists not only of the promotion of transparency that minimizes corruption 
opportunities. There are two more dimensions of the anticorruption struggle – 
diminishing corruption incentives and strengthening monitoring mechanisms. Although 
this report primarily focuses on the employment of ICTs in the anticorruption 
struggle (sections IV, V, VII, IX), it also touches upon other two dimensions and 
proposes recommendations for them (section VIII). This report seeks to contribute to 
the recent debate on corruption in Eastern Europe and in the CR. The ultimate goal of 
the report is to propose applicable recommendations for this policy area. While several 
reports on corruption are already available, there are hardly any papers and documents 
that offer specific recommendations. For example, there are recent reports on 
corruption in the CR and Eastern Europe by the EU Accession Monitoring Program – 
EUMAP.3 Although they offer comprehensive overviews of the present situation and 
should be regarded as good complements to this report their recommendations are 
surprisingly general and underdeveloped.4 
 
The next (second) section of the report defines corruption, specifies what are the costs 
and sources of corruption, and explains why corruption should be fought against. In 
order to better specify the possibilities for the employment of ICTs against corruption in 
the CR (and elsewhere in Eastern Europe) the third section offers a typology of 
                                                   
3 I refer to Reed 2002a; 2002b here. There are also other reports available on the EUMAP’s website (see 
section X for the link).  
4 A glaring example is a recommendation that concerns public prosecutors. According to EUMAP, steps 
should “be made in order to free public prosecutors from unhealthy influence” (see Reed 2002b: 68). 
What steps should be made is not specified. The same applies to ‘unhealthy influence’. The 
recommendation obviously does not say anything concrete, and so leaves one to wonder what is the 
significance of this proposal.   
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 corruption in Eastern Europe. This section also distinguishes between three dimensions 
of the anticorruption struggle – minimizing corruption opportunities, minimizing 
corruption incentives and strengthening control mechanisms – and underscores that 
ICTs are well-suited to be used for the elimination of corruption opportunities. The 
report states that the employment of ICTs must be accompanied by policy measures in 
the two other dimensions – minimizing corruption incentives and strengthening control 
mechanisms. The fourth section explains how ICTs can be used against the categories of 
corruption defined in the previous section. The fifth section summarizes the recent 
situation in the field of information policy in the CR and points out that no attention is 
paid to the use of ICTs against corruption. The report argues for deeper cooperation 
between the recently established Ministry of Informatics and the Ministry of Interior 
which is primarily responsible for the Czech anticorruption struggle. The sixth section 
presents selected evidence on corruption in the CR and the seventh section describes the 
anticorruption campaign of the Czech state. This section concludes with specific policy 
recommendations for the employment of ICTs in the anticorruption struggle and 
specifies agencies responsible for the fulfillment of the recommendations. This section 
also contains specific recommendations for making party finance more transparent. The 
eighth section extends the focus of the report to methods for the elimination of 
corruption incentives and to strategies for the strengthening of control mechanisms. In 
this section the report primarily concentrates on the recent civil service reform in the CR 
and the recently debated strategies aimed at uncovering corruption. The section 
concludes with specific policy recommendations for this area. The ninth section 
extensively describes the activities of NGOs that fight corruption in the CR. This section 
devotes special attention to the employment of ICTs for promoting the goals of the 
anticorruption NGOs and concludes with specific policy recommendations for this area. 
The last section briefly describes the available sources on corruption and the 
employment of ICTs against it.   
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 II. What is Corruption and Why to Fight It? 
What is corruption? The term corruption is used to describe a variety of activities. 
The students of corruption concentrate on various issues such as bribery, kickbacks, 
ethics violations, illegal asset accumulation, violations of procurement regulations, 
political nepotism, cronyism, campaign and party finance violations, money laundering, 
illegal transactions, freedom of information, public governance, financial accountability 
and many other issues (see, for example, World Bank 1998; 2000a: 103-109; 
Transparency International 2001). Although numerous definitions of corruption might 
be found in the literature, depending on the focus of a particular study, there is 
convergence on a basic definition that understands corruption as the abuse of public 
power for private benefit (World Bank 1997; McMoy and Heckel 2001). According to the 
World Bank (WB), corruption is “the abuse of public office for private gain. Public 
office is abused for private gain when an official accepts, solicits, or extorts a bribe. It is 
also abused when private agents actively offer bribes to circumvent public policies and 
processes for competitive advantage and profit. Public office can also be abused for 
personal benefit even if no bribery occurs, through patronage and nepotism, the theft of 
state assets, or the diversion of state revenues.” (World Bank 1997: 8-9) This definition is 
broad enough to encompass all types of corruption one encounters in reality. It also 
places the public sector at the center of the phenomena of corruption. This report uses 
this definition of corruption.  
 
What basic types of corruption do we distinguish? According to Rose-Ackerman 
corruption occurs when private agents try to obtain favorable treatment from public 
officials with the help of illicit payment: “(p)ayments are corrupt if they are illegally 
made to public agents with the goal of obtaining a benefit or avoiding a cost.” (Rose-
Ackerman 1999: 9) If corruption becomes widespread, it “is a symptom that something 
has gone wrong in the management of the state. Institutions designed to govern the 
interrelationship between the citizen and the state are used instead for personal 
enrichment and the provision of benefits to the corrupt.” (ibid.) Hence, corruption 
undermines the effectiveness of public administration and substantially decreases the 
quality of public governance. If corruption affects the structure of state bureaucracy it 
wipes out impartial officials and replaces stable and predictable rules applicable to all 
citizens with a system that provides benefits on the basis of the ‘purchasing power’ of 
individual clients. This type of corruption takes place at the office level and is called 
petty “bureaucratic corruption”. 
 
Petty bureaucratic corruption is often related to grand “political corruption” that 
affects politicians in the highest echelons of power. In other words, symbiosis is often 
established between corrupt bureaucrats and corrupt politicians. According to Donatella 
della Porta and Alberto Vannucci, the public official is “a necessary ally for the corrupt 
politician because his help is often necessary for the implementation of the political 
decisions that have been paid through bribes” (della Porta and Vannucci 1999: 138). 
Although it is analytically useful to keep the distinction between the two forms of 
corruption, one also needs to keep in mind what both of them have in common. Both 
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 types of corruption bring substantial economic, social and moral costs to the 
society affected by it.  
 
What are the costs of corruption? Bribery increases the prices of public works and 
services, makes the selection of contractors inefficient and wastes those resources that 
are used in covering illicit activities and obtaining political rents on the basis of 
manipulated political decisions and protection (della Porta and Vannucci 1999: 10). In 
addition to these immediate economic costs corruption brings negative long-term 
consequences mainly in the form of ineffective public administration and the general 
mistrust of the citizenry in political institutions of a corrupted state. In the words of 
Donatella della Porta and Alberto Vannucci, “the spread of corruption within the public 
service introduces elements of inefficiency, where the primary purpose of an operation 
becomes generation of payoffs. … the confidence of those in an organization not directly 
involved in corruption is undermined, leading to generalized inefficiency. At the level of 
the political system as a whole, the spread of corruption erodes the support and trust of 
citizens in democracy, in public institutions in general, and in the political class in 
particular.” (ibid.) Hence, corruption does not only hamper the functioning of public 
administration, but is able to substantially disrupt the democratic institutions of a 
corrupted state and progressively diminish public support for and trust in political 
institutions. Last but not least, corrupt members of the political class provide ample 
opportunities for the networks of organized crime to enter into the political system of a 
state affected by widespread corruption. Essentially, the costs caused by 
corruption are the reason why corruption should be fought against.  
 
Who are the main actors in corrupt exchanges? As the above-specified definition 
of corruption suggests the main actors of corrupt exchanges are typically corrupt 
bureaucrats and corrupt politicians, as well as private actors who illegally strive to get 
some benefit from the former two (see also della Porta and Meny 1997). These 
relationships can be depicted in a figure. Figure 1 shows corrupt exchanges between 
bribers, corrupt politicians and corrupt bureaucrats. Figure also shows main linkages 
among these actors and schematically summarizes the dimensions of corruption 
discussed in the previous paragraphs of the report. While horizontal arrows represent 
relationships that constitute great political corruption (the exchange of money for 
favorable political decisions between private actors and politicians), vertical arrows show 
relationships that constitute petty bureaucratic corruption between private actors and 
bureaucrats. The two-way arrow between bureaucrats and politicians illustrates 
symbiosis between petty and grand corruption.  
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 Figure 1: The Main Actors in Corrupt Exchanges and Relationships among Them 
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In addition to these ‘typical’ actors, corrupt exchanges often involve criminal networks 
and sometimes also the wider population that provides political support to corrupt 
politicians and gets clientelistic favors in return. Della Porta and Vannucci (1999: 23) 
depict the relationships among these actors of corrupt exchanges with the help of a 
simple figure (see Figure 2). The figure shows the main linkages that are established 
among actors in a highly corrupted polity, where the political elite pays for popular 
support by favors and where organized crime has obtained access to the political system.  
Figure 2: Role of Organized Crime in Illegal Exchanges Involving Corrupt Politicians 
                                                                                                     discretionary power, 
                                                                                                      favors, political  
                  consensus, political support                                 protection            
       VOTERS                                                     CORRUPT                                         BUREAUCRATS                              
                                                                            POLITICIAN                                                       
                          clientelistic favors                                                    silence  
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                                                                                              resources of intimidation    
                                                              
 
                                                              ORGANIZED CRIME 
 
Source: adopted from Della Porta and Vannucci 1999: 23. 
 
What are the sources of corruption? Corruption flourishes where there is no check 
on the discretionary powers of bureaucrats and where politicians are not held 
accountable to the citizens. In other words, corruption typically occurs where there is an 
opportunity for an exchange of resources and services that can be kept covert. 
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 Corruption occurs in the context of systems of rules that create opportunities for corrupt 
behavior. Therefore, when searching for the sources of corruption it is necessary to focus 
not on corrupt individuals, but on corrupt systems. In the words of Klitgaard et al., 
“instead of thinking about corruption in terms of an individual breaking the law and 
violating a trust (which are true), one thinks about systems that are more and less 
susceptible to various illicit activities” (2000: 26). Corruption does not prosper in 
systems (be they public offices, private firms, state institutions, non-governmental 
organizations, the offices of local administration) that are characterized by open 
democratic culture, open competition, transparent and predictable rules that limit the 
use of arbitrary power, developed system of control and easy access to information. 
According to Klitgaard et al., “(c)orruption loves multiple and complex regulations with 
ample and uncheckable official discretion.” (ibid.) Hence, one can schematically 
represent corruption (C) as the function of monopoly power (M) plus unchecked 
discretion (D) minus accountability (A): C = M + D – A (ibid.: 26-27).  
 
Therefore, instead of generating moralizing exhortations against corrupt bureaucrats 
and politicians one “should cold-bloodedly look for ways to reduce monopoly power, 
limit and clarify discretion, and increase transparency” (ibid.: 27). There is no point in 
morally denouncing corruption anymore. By now the consensus about the negative 
consequences of corruption has been established.5 Hence, in order to curb corruption 
one needs (1) to focus on it in a systematic way and (2) to diminish corruption 
opportunities by increasing the overall transparency of a system, i.e. by proposing 
such institutional solutions that would keep major political actors under control.   
 
                                                   
5 For descriptions of the process of institutionalization of the anticorruption norm, see Galtung 2000; 
Wang and Rosenau 2001; McCoy and Heckel 2001. 
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 III. Typology of Post-Communist Corruption and Dimensions of the 
Anticorruption Struggle 
Before specifying anticorruption strategies in more detail the following paragraphs focus 
on defining the forms of corruption in post-communist Eastern Europe (see 
Table 1). Table 1 offers a typology that consists of three groups of corrupt activities. The 
first group of corrupt practices is formed by petty bureaucratic corruption (low-
level administrative corruption). Bribery of public officials to bend rules and to get some 
benefit or favor (e.g. to escape punishment) belongs to that category (Table 1: I.A.). 
Bribery can be either initiated by the citizens or solicited by the bureaucrats who can 
even do it in an organized way. Corruption opportunities are further created by the 
deliberate over-regulation (I.B.) that makes the citizens to search for “shorter ways” to 
get their things done by offering a bribe. For example, in the CR this problem concerns 
the registration of firms by commercial courts (see Reed 2002a: 169-170). Another way 
how to solicit illicit payments especially from small entrepreneurs is via abusing 
inspection powers (I.C.). This is a particularly powerful strategy in the cases when the 
exact rules of doing business are not clearly stated and publicized, i.e. when I.B. is 
combined with I.C. (the structure of the paragraph draws on Karklins 2002: 24-25).  
Table 1: Typology of Post-Communist Corruption 
I. Low-level Administrative Corruption 
 
I.A. Bribery of public officials to bend rules 
I.B. Deliberate over-regulation, obfuscation, disorganization 
I.C. Using licensing and inspection powers for extortion 
II. Self-serving Asset Stripping by Officials 
 
II.A. Diverting public resources for civil servant spoils 
II.B. Mismanagement and profiteering from public resources 
II.C. Profiteering from privatization 
II.D. Malpractice in public procurement  
II.E. Nepotism, clientelism, and “selling” of jobs 
III. “State Capture” by Corrupt Networks 
 
III.A. De facto takeover of public institutions for private business or criminal activity 
III.B. Forming collusive networks to limit political competition 
III.C. Undermining free elections through slush funds, hidden advertising etc.  
III.D. Misuse of legislative power 
III.E. Corruption of the judicial process 
III.F. Misuse of auditing  
III.G. Using kompromat for political blackmail and coercion 
III.H. Corruption of and in the media 
Source: adopted from Karklins 2002: 24. 
 
Corrupt practices in the second group of the typology (see Table 1) belong to both the 
above-defined categories (petty and grand corruption). Resources can be diverted (II.A.) 
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 into “shadow” hidden budgets and “often the salaries of state officials and civil servants 
are supplemented with hidden second salaries and bonuses” (Karklins 2002: 25). Even 
more importantly, this type of corruption may lay the foundations of the above-
mentioned symbiosis between corrupt politicians and corrupt officials (see Figure 1): 
“(b)onuses and special salaries are paid at the discretion of supervisors, which gives 
them extensive leverage. While this use of discretionary power is problematic in itself, it 
is major tool to enforce compliance and even collusion.” (Karklins 2002: 26; 
emphasis added) Such collusion often leads to the misuse and embezzlement of the 
public property (II.B.). While this type of corruption is common for all countries around 
the world, specifically in the context of Eastern Europe profiteering from privatization 
turned out to be one of the most serious (II.C.). Nontransparent deals related to the 
privatization process characterized the post-communist development in Eastern Europe 
and there are many privatization scandals directly related to powerful politicians and 
political parties. For example, financial scandals related to illegal “privatization money” 
brought in 1997 to the end the coalition government in the CR (see Box 3). Corrupt 
activities of public officials and politicians did not stop once the biggest companies were 
privatized. As many companies were not privatized successfully, at the end of the day 
they had to be bailed out by the state. As a result, huge debts were concentrated in the 
hands of the state, thus providing the additional opportunity for nontransparent 
dealings with them. In the CR a single state institution – the Czech Consolidation 
Agency (CCA) - presently holds this type of debts. By the beginning of 2002, the CCA 
gathered debts for around 400 billion Czech crowns (CZK) - approximately 11 billion 
USD at that time - and it was expected that it would overtake additional 200 billion CZK 
(Spurny 2002a). The CCA presently sells the debts for fragments of their original prices, 
and thus makes it possible for all those responsible for the mismanaged privatizations to 
regain control in “their” firms (Spurny 2002b). Needless to say, this system does not 
only create opportunities for corruption, but it directly invites it.6 The same applies for 
public procurement (II.D.). It is safe to say that public procurement in the CR is 
manipulated and mismanaged not only at the level of central state offices, but also at the 
level of municipalities and regions. For example, between 2000 and 2002 the Czech 
government acquired an “absolute exemption” from the provisions of the Law on Public 
Contracts that regulates public procurement. The exemption allowed the government to 
avoid organizing public tenders (for more, see subsection VII.1). An outrageous case of 
widespread corruption that almost resulted into the murder of an investigative journalist 
was discovered at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2002 (see, for example, Spurny and 
Kundra 2002). Further, public tenders organized at the municipal level are often 
affected by conflict of interest. For example, in Prague a coalition of NGOs was 
established in order to fight cases of corrupt public tenders (for more, see subsection 
IX.3). Last but not least, this group of corrupt activities contains nepotism, clientelism 
and “selling of positions” that take place at all levels of public administration and in all 
state and municipal institutions (II.E.).  
                                                   
6 In addition, according to some accounts, the system provides opportunity for money laundering (see 
Pokorny 2003).  
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 Figure 3: Composite Index of State Capture 
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Source: Hellman et al. 2000: 9. Autor's presentation of the data. 
 
The third group of corrupt activities is formed by great political corruption (see 
Table 1). In line with the WB’s definition of corruption Table 1 uses the term “state 
capture” instead of “political corruption”; however, both terms describe the same 
phenomenon – high-level systemic corruption. The WB distinguishes state capture 
from administrative corruption, which is the distinction that corresponds with the 
differentiation between petty bureaucratic and great political corruption. According to 
the WB, state capture (i.e. great political corruption) “refers to the actions of individuals, 
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 groups, or firms in both the public and private sectors to influence the formation of laws, 
regulations, decrees, and other government policies (i.e., the basic rules of the game) to 
their own advantage by means of the illicit and non-transparent provision private 
benefits to public officials” (World Bank 2000b: 1). The WB further defines state capture 
according to its primary locus (it can occur in the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, 
or state regulatory agencies), the type of the actor that captures (it can be private firms, 
political leaders, or narrow interest groups) and the nature of illicit benefit provided to 
state officials (direct bribes, illicit equity stakes, informal control rights). However, all 
forms of great political corruption are aimed at “extracting rents from the state for a 
narrow range of individuals, firms, or sectors through distorting the basic legal and 
regulatory framework, with potentially enormous losses for the society at large” (ibid.: 
2). Figure 3 shows the composite index of state capture for twenty two East European 
countries. 
 
Rasma Karklins breaks political corruption down into eight distinctive categories (see 
Table 1). The de facto takeover of public institutions is an extreme case of state capture 
(III.A.). In this case criminal networks penetrate state institutions and de facto privatize 
the state in order to make it to serve their particularistic interests. Another type of 
corrupt activities is collusive networks formation. Collusive networks (III.B.) are usually 
formed between post-communist nomenklatura and the new managerial class for self-
serving purposes (Karklins 2002: 28). A further type of corruption is illicit campaign 
finance (III.C.). In this case a powerful group seeks to acquire political power by secretly 
supporting certain political forces in the election campaign. However, the efforts of 
powerful interests to influence policy-making do not stop after the elections. Indeed, the 
safest way to shape legislation is via the direct “purchasing” of desired laws (II.D.). For 
example, there is no regulation of parliamentary lobbying in the CR. As a result, 
“(a)ccording to experienced MPs, the effect of uncontrolled lobbying on legislative 
process has become more serious over time. Recent cases in which lobbying behind the 
scenes is regarded as the main influence on Parliament’s decision on important laws 
include the passages of legislation to abolish duty-free shops in 2001, the passage of a 
Lotteries Act in 1998 and of Hunting Act in 2001.” (Reed 2002a: 166) Corrupt activities 
may also flourish in the judicial system (III.E.). This type of corruption takes many 
different forms. For example, in the CR there are clans around some county courts that 
are formed by some local judges, state prosecutors, attorneys, police bosses and other 
members of local elites. In line with the operational logic of a clan these networks 
manipulate only those cases which involve huge amounts of money and/or affect 
someone from the network. Hence, their activities cannot be easily discovered. 
According to some estimates, the total proportion of the manipulated court cases 
amounts to 18 per cent of all court decisions in a particular locality (Sazavsky 2002). 
Related to judicial corruption is the misuse of auditing, investigative, and control powers 
(III.F.). As this type of corruption tends to affect the monitoring agencies that are 
supposed to fight it, it is especially dangerous. In the worst cases the monitoring 
agencies are misused for the generation of kompromata against the political rivals of 
corrupt politicians (III.G.). Frequently, cooperation of corrupt journalists is needed in 
order to achieve that goal (III.H.).  
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 In order to achieve the ultimate goal of this research, namely to propose methods for 
curbing public-sector corruption with the help of ICTs, it was necessary to distinguish 
between different types of corruption. There are various types of corruption and not 
all of them can be successfully fought against with the help of ICTs. By and large, ICTs 
help in increasing the transparency of the system (see the next section). However, their 
use must be accompanied by other policy measures in order to make an 
anticorruption strategy of a particular state effective and successful. 
 
If an anticorruption strategy is to be viable, it must be designed as a multi-pronged 
endeavor that includes a set of complex measures in different spheres of society and 
state organization. Thus, the employment of ICTs in public administration will not bring 
any tangible results in the anticorruption effort unless it is accompanied by other 
measures aimed at fighting corruption in the public sector. For example, even if there is 
a considerable effort to computerize public administration processes in order to make 
them more transparent and citizen-friendly, this effort will encounter a major resistance 
from the side of civil servants if they are underpaid, lacking career prospects and unable 
or unwilling to acquire necessary skills. After all, why should they cooperate if their only 
advantage - unchecked discretion - is going to be minimized by enabling the interested 
publics and auditing institutions to monitor their behavior? Probably, in order to make 
them more cooperative a stable system of civil service must be put in place together 
with requirements for civil servants’ integrity and tough control mechanisms, 
including clearly defined penalty provisions. 
 
More specifically, one needs to define all dimensions of the anticorruption 
struggle and the role ICTs can play in it. In order to fight corruption one needs to focus 
on three distinctive aspects – (1) corruption opportunities; (2) corruption incentives, i.e. 
salaries; and (3) the likelihood of detection and punishment of corrupt activities, i.e. 
policing (Quah 2001: 30). A successful anticorruption strategy should incorporate all the 
three dimensions. Thus, it has to (1) specify methods for minimizing corruption 
opportunities via increased transparency; (2) diminish corruption incentives through 
putting in place a stable system of civil service, including clearly defined career 
prospects and a system of remuneration, and (3) increase the probability of 
detection of corrupt activities, i.e. develop concrete control mechanisms. This 
report touches upon all the three aspects of the anticorruption effort (on the civil service 
reform and the control mechanisms, see section VIII). However, it primarily focuses on 
minimizing corruption opportunities, as it is this dimension where ICTs hold the 
biggest potential for promoting the anticorruption effort (see the next section).  
 
 
16
 IV. Can Information Technologies Curb Corruption? 
The recent boom of ICTs brought about an extensive debate on the potential new 
technologies hold for restructuring public governance and for eventually reforming the 
institutions of representative democracy (see Hacker and van Dijk 2000; Bennett and 
Entman 2001; DiMaggio et al. 2001). While there are some e-enthusiasts who believe 
in the almost unlimited potential of new technologies for making public administration 
more effective and for reinvigorating political participation of the citizens through the 
electronic means, the more balanced accounts point out difficulties and problems 
alongside the heralded promises (Crabtree 2002; Steyaert 2002; Walch 2002; Matsuura 
2003). Moreover, according to some pessimist arguments, the boom of ICTs may not 
bring any democratic improvements, i.e. e-democracy; instead it can lead to a new 
version of dictatorship – e-tatorship (Thompson 2002).  
 
It is clear that ICTs alone will not bring any major impact on the existing institutions and 
procedures. Non-democratic systems continue to be undemocratic even after the 
elements of e-government are introduced into them. According to Thompson, the 
belief, “that e-government and e-Democracy are in some way coextensive is one that 
should be rejected. There is no limitation on the use of computers and the Internet to 
mature democracies, and no reason to assume that the technology is inherently 
democratic…” (ibid.) Moreover, electronic media can create additional opportunities for 
strengthening the position of undemocratic rulers if they manage to monopolize control 
over their deployment. In such cases, as there is no democracy, it does not make sense to 
be focusing on how to make it electronic; rather, it is necessary to look at “the ways we 
democratise the ‘e’” (ibid.). Therefore, in order to bring the potential of ICTs for 
democracy to its full realization, one needs to understand them in the context of broader 
political and behavioral changes. ICTs do not automatically lead to democracy. E-
democracy “is not about applications; it’s not about the tools. It’s about the changes in 
the system, technology, and people – the whole lot. Consequently, it’s not technology 
alone that’s going to make Internet-permeated society an e-democracy.” (Steyaert 2002) 
Nobody disputes the potential ICTs hold for making democracy more transparent and 
open to the citizens; nobody disputes that there is a genuine opportunity to use ICTs for 
fostering political participation of the population. However, this cannot happen 
automatically. In order to take advantage of ICTs for further democratization, it is 
necessary to conceive them in the broader context of the existing political and social 
institutions.  
 
In a similar vein, although ICTs hold potential for curbing corruption, they cannot 
automatically turn corrupt systems into transparent ones. If a corrupt government 
introduces ICTs, it can in the best case become a corrupt e-government, but hardly a 
transparent and effective government. There are different opinions concerning the 
potential of ICTs for curbing public-sector corruption. As ICTs generated a revolution in 
thinking about the future of the governance of public matters, the use of them has 
lately come to be perceived as a simple recipe that, if successfully applied, would help us 
to put a stop to all corrupt exchanges. The unpredictably rapid development of the 
Internet and other technological devices is expected not only to reorganize public 
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 administration, but also to make both the public-sector officials and the executives 
more accountable to the citizens. From this vantage point, the soft power of 
electronic media should make the notoriously self-interested bureaucrats to finally 
pursue the public interest proper. Such ideas sometimes result in the so-called ‘Panoptic 
vision’. This vision implies that due to the management control made possible by the 
development of ICTs the ultimate victory over public-sector corruption is a matter of 
several forthcoming years. However, although the new technological applications have a 
genuine transformative potential in the field of curbing corruption, their use must be 
precisely specified and accompanied by additional institutional measures if 
it is to result in a tangible inhibition of corrupt activities (Heeks 1998; 1999). 
 
To begin with, all types of petty bureaucratic corruption (see Table 1) can be 
powerfully diminished through the increased transparency achieved by using 
modern electronic media. If all administrative rules, procedures and requirements were 
publicized on the Internet there would be no room for over-regulation and 
disorganization (see Table 1: I.B.). In a similar vein, if individual administrative 
decisions were published on the Internet together with the names of responsible 
bureaucrats it would become difficult to issue a corrupt decision, since it might raise 
doubts in the informed public (Table 1: I.A. and I.C.). For example, it would be easy to 
manipulate the waiting list of the applicants for public flats if the list were kept by a 
single official in her drawer. It would become nearly impossible if the list were kept on 
the Internet and every applicant could check her position at every moment. The same 
concerns court decisions. It would be relatively easy for a judge or a court administrator 
to slow down the proceeding of a case if there were no clear requirement to give account 
to the parties in the case. As soon as the histories of the cases of a particular court are 
accessible through the Internet this type of manipulation is made impossible. As a result, 
an opportunity for corruption in the judicial process is substantially diminished (Table 1: 
III. E.).  
 
Generally, the employment of the Internet in the administrative proceedings in all fields 
of public administration brings more transparency; therefore, it minimizes the 
opportunities for public officials to monopolize access to relevant information and to 
extract bribes from their clients. Petty corruption can be substantially curbed by 
the employment of ITCs. For instance, the OPEN System developed for the city 
administration of Seoul (see Box 1) offers an example of the successful use of ICTs in the 
anticorruption struggle. Due to the OPEN System the status of every application 
submitted to the city administration of Seoul can be checked via the Internet. In this 
respect, citizens can acquire real time information on their applications and can find out 
who is currently reviewing them, their status, estimated date of approval, or reasons for 
which applications were returned. However, as the case of the anticorruption strategy 
used in Seoul also well illustrates, the application of ICTs is not a universal panacea for 
the problem of corruption. The OPEN system was introduced as one of the elements of a 
complex anticorruption strategy based on preventive and punitive measures, 
transparency of administration and public private partnership introduced prior to 
computerization (Transparency International 2003a: 25). 
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 Box 1: An Example of a Successful Application – The OPEN System 
“The Online Procedures ENhancement for Civil Applications (OPEN) System refers to a 
system that discloses the administrative procedures, that are susceptible to 
improprieties, and allows the citizens to monitor the status of their applications on the 
Internet. For example, a citizen who applies for a construction permit no longer needs to 
meet or call the official assigned to the case but can check each step of the procedure and 
the outcome with real time information at home or at work on the computer. Those who 
are not familiar with computers or have limited access to the Internet can look up the 
information at the local … ward office with the assistance of office personnel. Until now, 
other similar systems … only provided final decisions through the Internet. The OPEN 
System, however, is a dynamic system that makes available real time information on the 
status of an application, tracking its progress until its finalization. The approval dates 
and contents of the investigation by the chief clerk, the section chief, and the director as 
well as the schedule timetable, and detailed descriptions for returned documents or 
incomplete documents are made available to the applicant as the decisions occur.” 
An excerpt from a detailed description of the OPEN system. Available at 
http://english.metro.seoul.kr/government/policies/anti/civilapplications/ 
 
The employment of ICTs can also powerfully foster the anticorruption struggle 
against the corrupt practices included in the second group of the typology of 
post-communist corruption (see Table 1: II.). A computerized system makes it 
possible to develop more accessible tools for controlling the ‘shadow’ budgets 
established for diverting public resources for personal benefits (II.A.). Naturally, left on 
its own, computerization does not solve anything. Moreover, it can only provide an 
additional opportunity to qualified computer operators to gather funds for themselves. 
For example, in a public work department a computerized payroll system was 
introduced with the intention to remove all “ghost workers” from the system. However, 
18 months after the introduction of the system an audit was done and it uncovered a 
computer operator who was collecting not only his own wage, but also wages of thirty 
nonexistent workers added by him to the system (the case study adopted from Heeks 
1999).  
 
Although ICTs cannot automatically bring transparency to a mismanaged 
system, they can facilitate it. It is far easier to control a computerized payroll system 
than to be checking piles of papers. Hence, although ICTs themselves cannot put a stop 
to the misuse of public resources, they make it possible to disclose it better, if their 
employment is accompanied by the strengthen control mechanisms, i.e. if the probability 
of disclosure is increased (Table 1: II.A.). The same concerns mismanagement and 
profiteering from public resources (Table 1: II.B.) and profiteering from privatization 
(Table 1: II.C.). ICTs make it more probable for monitoring agencies and the police to 
discover cases that belong to this category. Moreover, ICTs can also be a major obstacle 
for the cultivation of corrupt ties in the political system. If political parties were 
obliged to submit their annual financial reports to an independent auditor and to 
publicize them on the parliamentary website, it would bring a powerful systemic tool 
that could prevent political corruption (Table 1: III.B.; C.; D.; for more, see below; Box 3; 
and subsection VI.2).  
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The importance of ICTs for the transparency of public procurement (Table 1: 
II.D.) has already been widely demonstrated. The Internet is typically used for providing 
comprehensive information about biding opportunities at a single website that can be 
accessed by potential bidders and citizens (Transparency International 2003a: 27-29). 
Although the direct evidence is missing, it is believed that the employment of the 
Internet will make public procurement schemes more transparent and accessible to a 
wider range of bidders, thus leading to a decrease in prices of public contracts. For 
example, in the case of Chile, savings between 7 and 20 per cent were reported after the 
introduction of elements of e-procurement (ibid.: 28). However, the employment of ICTs 
cannot automatically improve mismanaged procurement - the example of the CR 
demonstrates that providing comprehensive information on the Internet is not a magic 
solution. Although since 2000 all calls for public tenders must be publicized on a central 
website, public procurement in the CR displays signs of manipulation and corruption 
(for more, see subsection VII.1). The same applies to nepotism, clientelism and “selling” 
of jobs (Table 1: II.E.). Although publicizing vacant places on the Internet seemingly 
improves the situation, it does not in itself prevent nontransparent deals that are usually 
made prior to the job opening.  
 
The employment of ICTs may also play an important role in preventing some types 
of grand political corruption. There is probably no possibility for using ICTs against 
corruption if the state is completely captured by criminal networks (Table 1: III.A.; B.). 
However, ICTs can definitely help minimize corruption opportunities in the cases of 
illicit party finance, legislative and judicial corruption (Table 1: III.C.; D.; E.). 
First, political parties should be obliged to subject their annual financial reports to an 
independent auditor institution and the reports together with the reports of auditors 
should be made accessible on the website of the Parliament (for more, see subsection 
VII.3). For example, in the CR political parties submit the reports in one hard copy that 
is accessible in the library of the Chamber of Deputies. This does not ensure that the 
wide public can keep its eye on party finance in the CR. If the reports were made publicly 
accessible through the Internet the situation would be much better. This measure would 
also serve as an additional disciplining mechanism for party bosses to submit as detailed 
and true reports as possible.  
 
Second, as noted above, there is no regulation of parliamentary lobbying in the CR, 
which means that lobbying activities cannot be controlled. In order to make the situation 
more transparent the obligatory registration of lobbyists should be required and the list 
of the recognized lobbyists should be made public through the Internet. This list should 
also contain the record of the lobby activities of the recognized lobbyists (see also 
subsection VII.2).  
 
Third, ICTs can improve the situation in the judiciary. If the record of court cases were 
publicized through the Internet every citizen could check each step of the procedure and 
the final decision at home or at work on the computer. Most importantly, if the 
computerized system were introduced it would become impossible to obstruct court 
procedures. Obstructions often excessively delay the final decision. Further, specifically 
in the CR, the employment of ICTs can help solve the problem of corrupt registration of 
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 firms by commercial courts. Presently, as it is not absolutely clear what the exact 
requirements for firm’s registration are, the courts often turn the applications down and 
the whole procedure becomes too long. In addition, this system creates corruption 
opportunities for middlemen – some attorneys and attorney offices – who obtain the 
registrations in return for the extra payments from the applicants. If the exact 
requirements for each commercial court were published on the Internet the probability 
of rejection would be substantially decreased and the opportunity to extract bribes from 
the applicants would no longer exist. Indeed, it is a project currently carried out by the 
Czech chapter of Transparency International (see also subsection IX.2).  
 
All available documents focused on curbing public-sector corruption stress that in order 
to carry out a successful anticorruption strategy, credible political leadership must be 
ensured (see, for example, Langseth et al. 2000: 63; Quah 2001: 34; World Bank 
2000b). According to this standard story, credible leadership is a necessary precondition 
for the anticorruption effort. If the elected politicians do not comply with the high 
standards of personal integrity, any anticorruption effort will lose its credibility in the 
eyes of the public. Therefore, it is necessary that the government does not misuse its 
unique standing of chief executive and that the country’s political parties are funded in a 
transparent way, thus preventing political corruption from flourishing.  
 
However, these recommendations do not focus at the problem of corruption in a 
systemic way. They subscribe to a perspective that conceives of corruption in terms of an 
individual breaking the law instead of looking at the possibilities for making corrupt 
systems more transparent. Hence, instead of searching for innovative institutional 
solutions, they point out individual moral qualities as a necessary condition for a 
successful anticorruption struggle.7 However, as already noted above, it is necessary to 
focus on the institutional possibilities that could change the organization of the 
system in a way that would make even corrupt politicians to follow public 
interest. Indeed, as specified above in this section, there are ways how to use ICTs in 
order to make the executive, the legislature as well as the judiciary more transparent and 
accountable to the public.  
 
Electronic media not only directly help curb public-sector corruption by increasing the 
transparency of the political and administrative systems, but can also facilitate the 
activities and cooperation of the actors focused on fighting corruption (see also section 
IX). As corruption flourishes when there is a monopoly of power (usually on the side 
of state bureaucrats), it is vital that actors other than the state officials get involved in 
the anticorruption campaign. As noted above, even the most extensive computerization 
cannot turn a corrupt system under the control of a powerful clique into a transparent 
one. In this case, electronic tools make the entrenched powerholders even more 
powerful, as they acquire additional means of power and influence.  
 
Therefore, it is the activities of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and media 
independent of the state that are vital in keeping the engine of the anticorruption 
struggle going. In this respect, ICTs can enhance the involvement of diverse actors 
                                                   
7 For this point I am especially grateful to Laszlo Bruszt.  
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 representing various social interests so as to (1) de-monopolize the anticorruption effort; 
and (2) to enable various actors to obtain information about the activities of other actors. 
This holds the potential of increasing the transparency of the whole system without 
concentrating the power of control in the hands of a single institutional actor such as the 
state. This strategy fully utilizes the potential of the ICTs. It aims at a decentralized 
model of corruption control and therefore, preempts the mismanagement of information 
technology by asymmetrically empowered actors such as the state or municipal 
bureaucrats. For example, in the CR as part of the struggle against the conflict of interest 
of the deputies of municipal assemblies the Prague based NGO Regeneration publicized 
on the Internet the list of deputies of the central Prague assembly and of their 
involvement in private firms that take part in local public tenders (for more, see section 
IX). 
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 V. Information Society Building in the CR 
As demonstrated in the previous section, ICTs hold potential for curbing corruption. 
Also, as noted above, the introduction of ICTs into public administration has recently 
come to be debated under the headings ‘information society building’ and ‘e-government 
building’. The problematic of e-government became an issue also in the CR. There is a 
perceived need to utilize the potential of ICTs for making the administrative processes 
more effective and transparent. However, it was not primarily the problem of corruption 
that made the government to consider the use of ICTs. Rather, the perception that ICTs 
in public administration were employed spontaneously, uncoordinatedly and 
ineffectively in the beginning of the 1990s and the international trends drove the 
coordination of activities in this area.  
 
The beginning of the coordination of the state information policy dates back to 1998. 
In this year the Governmental Council for State Information Policy was established as an 
interdepartmental body for the coordination of the activities in the area of information 
policy. In 1999 the government adopted a basic political document, the State 
Information Policy, which was in 2000 followed by the Action Plan for the Completion of 
the State Information Policy. The stated priorities of the state information policy are (1) 
information and digital literacy; (2) IT-based democracy; (3) development of public 
administration information systems; (4) communications infrastructure; (5) 
trustworthiness and security of information systems and personal data protection; (6) e-
commerce; (7) transparent economic environment and (8) information society: stable 
and safe (Statni informacni politika 1999). 
 
In the 2001 state budget 865 million Czech Crowns (CZK) were devoted to the projects 
specified in the Action Plan. In 2002 the CR joined the eEurope+ initiative which is a 
version of the well known EU eEurope initiative modified for the candidate countries. 
The aim of the initiative is to ensure greater competitiveness of the candidate countries 
through the use of ICTs. In October 2000 the Office for Public Information Systems 
(OPIS) was established. The OPIS was an office of the central public administration and 
was responsible for the development and integration of public administration 
information systems. Since the beginning of 2003 the responsibilities of the OPIS have 
been overtaken by the newly established Ministry of Informatics (see Ministry of 
Informatics 2003). In addition to these developments, new legal norms that were meant 
to facilitate the progress of information society and e-government in the CR were 
gradually adopted, the most important among those the Law on Public Information 
Systems and the Law on Electronic Signature. Therefore, the European Commission, in 
its 2001 Regular Report on the Czech Republic’s Progress towards Accession, stated 
that “(g)ood progress has been made in the area of the information society” (European 
Commission 2001: 48). 
 
On the other hand, despite the adoption of the Law on Electronic Signature, due to the 
lack of implementation the electronic signature could not be used in the official 
communication between citizens and public offices. In addition, some provisions of the 
law have recently been disputed and, according to some accounts, the law allows for 
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 several contradictory interpretations. The author of the law did not accept the criticisms 
and set about to defend it against the critiques (for the debate, see a theme section in 
Inside 2002). However, as a result of these uncertainties and the uncoordinated nature 
of the law’s implementation the electronic signature is underused in the CR. According 
to the experts, this has to do with the general climate in the civil service that is 
generally e-government-unfriendly. However, provided that there are some other 
important IT-based projects being prepared, ensuring the wider support of civil servants 
is critical for these projects’ success.  
 
In the 1990s the building of e-government faced several further problems (The 
Leadership Forum 2002). First, there were not enough resources available from public 
sources and the available limited sources were not spent in an effective way. This had to 
do with the lack of coordination of information systems’ building. According to the 
former minister without a portfolio, who was responsible for the employment of 
information technologies in public administration, only 20 per cent of the resources 
channeled to the building and upgrading of information systems in the public sector 
were spent in a coordinated way (ISSS 2002). Instead of coordination, the building of 
information systems in the CR was marked by “sectoralism”, i.e. by an approach driven 
by the particularistic interests of respective ministries and other central offices. Hence, 
the most important problem was a lack of a competent coordinating agency such as a 
Ministry of Information or a similar type of the central state office. The situation was 
characterized by a diffusion of authority over the introduction of e-government in the 
CR. The competencies were dispersed among the minister without a portfolio, the OPIS 
and some other ministries. As a result, there was no institution able to make particular 
offices cooperate and to impose a single standard on them. As one observer said, it was 
enough to have a look at the web presentations of different ministries in order to 
understand that standardization was needed (Jirkovsky 2002). 
  
Therefore, the earlier version of this report (see also Cisar 2002b) concluded: although 
the employment of ICTs should ultimately contribute to a more decentralized 
organization of public administration, their introduction needs an agency to coordinate 
the activities of all involved actors.8 This was proven by international experience. If such 
an agency is lacking there is no institutional representation of the interest in the use of 
ICTs in public administration. Therefore, the experts active in the field underscore that 
the problem of the employment of ICTs is primarily political. It is necessary to make a 
political decision whether and to what extent one needs the ICT applications and 
whether and to what extent there are citizens ready to use them.  
 
The recent establishment of the Ministry of Informatics is the concrete response to 
the above-identified problems. The ministry is primarily responsible for the portal of 
public administration, for the preparatory work on the legal framework for e-commerce 
and e-government (specifically for a single design of the IT-based public administration 
registers), for the building of a single communication infrastructure for the public 
                                                   
8 The interim research report also recommended: a well-empowered coordinating institution has to be 
designed to implement the goals of the state information policy. This agency should have the status of a 
ministry. This can be done in two ways: either a new ministry is established or an existing one extends its 
agenda so that it fully incorporates information society building in the CR. 
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 administration offices, for the standardization of the public administration information 
systems, for the legislation of the telecommunication industry, for the regulation of the 
Czech post and for the promotion of computer literacy among the population (Ministry 
of Informatics 2003). The last goal is particularly pressing in view of the fact that when 
compared to other countries, the Czech citizens have not fared very well as regards 
computerized communication with public offices. According to a research conducted by 
Taylor Nelson Sofres in 2001, the use of on-line communication with public 
administration within the last 12 months was reported by 17 per cent of the population of 
the CR. In the international comparison made by the same consortium this is a result 
that ensures an average ranking for the CR. However, 28 per cent of the population 
intends to use on-line communication in the future (Taylor Nelson Sofres 2001). There 
will be a growing segment of the population willing to communicate through the Internet 
and it is to a large extent up to the state if there will be conditions conducive to a wider 
use of the Internet. 
 
All the problems notwithstanding, the situation was gradually improving even before the 
establishment of the Ministry of Informatics. For example, the web presentations of all 
major state offices as well as municipalities in the CR have improved tremendously and 
today some of the websites provide the citizen with rich and well-structured information 
regarding the particular sector of public administration. Ministries established electronic 
entry points at their websites and on the basis of the Law on Free Access to Information 
(adopted in 1999) extended the scope of publicly provided information. There are several 
other promising developments in this field such as an effort to establish a public 
administration portal (www.centralni-adresa.cz) which is particularly important from 
the point of view of a greater transparency of public procurement. Since 2000 all calls 
for public tenders must be posted there and it is even possible to find the winners of 
public tenders there (see also Reed 2002: 175).9  
 
In line with the recommendations of the earlier version of this report the program of 
information society building was concentrated in the hands of the new ministry; 
however, the employment of ICTs for curbing public-sector corruption has 
not yet found the way to the agenda of the new institution. In view of the 
demonstrated opportunities for the use of electronic tools in the anticorruption fight (see 
section IV), this is regrettable. The Ministry of Information should without delay start 
cooperation with the Ministry of Interior which is primarily responsible for the 
preparation and fulfillment of the governmental anticorruption strategy. Presently, the 
anticorruption strategy does not pay any attention to the employment of ICTs. The 
coordinated effort of the two ministries should bring the issue to the 
political agenda and stimulate cooperation with other central offices of 
public administration and ministries such as the Ministry of Justice. For example, 
the Ministry of Informatics is responsible for the preparation of a single design of the IT-
based public administration registers. It will consist of the register of inhabitants; the 
register of economic units; and the register of territorial identification and immobilities. 
Especially in the case of the register of economic units ICTs can improve the presently 
                                                   
9 However, there are numerous problems related to public procurement in the CR. Public procurement is 
considered nontransparent and prone to manipulation and corruption (for more information, see section 
VII.1). 
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 disconcerting situation that is characterized not only by the lack of a central registry but 
also by extensive bribery. Although the direct evidence is lacking, it seems that the 
present system opened a wide room for ‘intermediary agents’ - some attorneys’ offices 
and individual attorneys - to virtually monopolize, probably in cooperation with court 
officials, the points of registration – the commercial courts - and ‘cash’ access to them 
(based on confidential information; see also Reed 2002a: 169). Therefore, the 
employment of ICTs must be incorporated into the governmental strategy 
for curbing corruption. Specific policy recommendations for the employment 
of ICTs in the anticorruption campaign in the CR are listed in the following paragraphs 
(subsection VII.2). Before that, however, the report focuses in the following section on 
the selected evidence on corruption in the CR.  
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 VI. Selected Evidence on Corruption in the CR 
VI. 1. General Overview 
In the CR the fight against corruption became one of the stated priorities of the 
government that came to power in 1998. However, despite the increased attention paid 
to corruption between 1998-2002, corruption continues to be perceived as one of the 
most pressing problems of the CR and its civil service. Indeed, the recent assessments 
indicate that corruption is on the rise. Although part of this perceived increase can 
be attributed to the fact that, unlike in the beginning of the 1990s, the problem of 
corruption has currently been put to the center of attention (for general background 
information, see Box 2 and for specific data on the CR, see Figure 5) there seems to be a 
clear indication that corruption persistently remains one of the important problems 
of the country. In its 2001 Regular Report on the Czech Republic’s Progress towards 
Accession European Commission states that although the Czech authorities have already 
taken several important measures to strengthen the fight against corruption and 
organized crime, “corruption and economic crime (fraud, money laundering, 
institutional theft and the phenomenon of “tunneling” or asset-stripping) remain a 
serious cause for concern. In fact, surveys of public opinion show a consistent increase in 
the perception of corruption and economic crime.” (European Commission 2001: 20)  
 
Box 2: International Environment and the Effects of Increased 
Attention to Corruption 
Transparency and ‘sound’ governance have become buzzwords of a globalized world. 
Correspondingly, transparency’s “other” – corruption - came to the fore of public 
attention. The issues of bribery, ethics violations, illegal asset accumulation, violation of 
procurement regulations, political nepotism, cronyism and other similar activities 
appeared suddenly in the global agenda, from where they are gradually trickling down to 
the polities of respective states. Although it seems that the world is more corrupted today 
than it used to be ten years ago, the burgeoning literature on the problem suggests that it 
is rather the substantially increased political and scholarly attention paid to the problem 
of corruption than the corruption itself that has undergone a radical boom during the 
last several years. Transparency and corruption go hand in hand in a number of 
academic publications, newspaper articles, international financial institutions’ reports 
and recommendations. The IMF and the World Bank have included transparency into 
their conditionality requirements, and the OECD followed suit with the anticorruption 
regulation. In the 1990s, the anti-bribery norm became a firmly institutionalized 
international standard for the increasingly integrated world. Nowadays, even the most 
corrupted officials are compelled to frame their public discourse in terms of 
transparency and integrity.  
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 The available evidence on corruption in the CR is of two types. The first type of evidence 
is quantitative data in the form of numbers of persons prosecuted, investigated, 
accused and convicted in relation to corruption. While this type of evidence constitutes a 
relatively reliable source of data, due to the fact that it consists only of the actually 
disclosed cases of supposed corruption it certainly heavily underestimates the real 
level of corruption in the country. This type of data is presented in the two following 
tables. The data are divided into five distinct categories, as they are defined by the 
Criminal Law: abuse of power by a public official (paragraph 158); failure to perform 
task by a public official through neglect (par. 159); accepting a bribe (par. 160); bribery 
(par. 161) and indirect bribery (par. 162). 
Table 2: The Number of Prosecuted and Investigated Persons in Cases Related to 
Corruption 
Year 
Par. 158 
Abuse of 
Power  
by a 
Public 
Official 
Par. 159 
Failure to 
Perform  
Task by a 
Public  
Official 
through 
Neglect 
Par. 160 
Accepting 
a Bribe 
Par. 161 
Bribery 
Par. 162 
Indirect 
Bribery 
Bribery 
(Total)  
1993 185 4 46 85 6 137 
1994 325 20 50 94 1 145 
1995 234 6 34 135 2 171 
1996 232 15 25 110 5 140 
1997 211 11 18 68 6 92 
1998 250 6 37 106 3 146 
1999 304 20 32 80 2 114 
2000 262 17 18 88 2 108 
2001 283 18 15 142 6 163 
Source: MVCR 2002. 
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 Table 3: The Number of Accused and Convicted Persons in Cases Related to Corruption 
  
Par. 158 
Abuse of 
Power by a 
Public 
Official  
Par. 159 
Failure to 
Perform 
Task by a 
Public 
Official 
through 
Neglect 
Par. 160 
Accepting a 
Bribe 
Par. 161 
Bribery 
Par. 162 
Indirect 
Bribery 
Year Acc. Con. Acc. Con. Acc. Con Acc. Con. Acc. Con. 
1993 70 18 0 0 27 6 108 47 2 0 
1994 205 86 13 2 55 18 140 68 3 3 
1995 198 78 11 0 60 23 177 88 1 1 
1996 247 79 3 0 65 24 169 111 11 2 
1997 220 69 9 3 29 34 122 98 0 1 
1998 236 100 4 4 41 20 140 88 4 1 
1999 253 85 6 9 68 19 119 88 4 3 
2000 232 100 6 3 48 49 106 68 4 1 
2001 262 99 8 1 51 28 149 83 1 3 
Source: MVCR 2002. 
  
The second type of evidence is provided by international and domestic surveys of 
corrupt behavior. The most-widely-referred-to international survey is the 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) published every year by the international non-
governmental organization Transparency International (TI). Although the CPI faces 
serious methodological problems and in fact does not measure corruption, it 
nevertheless provides a suitable tool for assessing the trend in the perceptions of 
corruption in the countries included in the survey.10 The highest score a country can get 
is 10 (a country without corruption); the lowest score is 0 (high occurrence of 
corruption). The trend displayed by the CPI proves that despite the measures taken to 
curb corruption, it is gaining strength in the CR (see Tables 4 and 5). 
 
                                                   
10 According to TI, the CPI ranks “countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist 
among public officials and politicians. It is a composite index, drawing on 14 different polls and surveys 
from seven independent institutions carried out among business people and country analysts, including 
surveys of residents, both local and expatriate.” 
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 Table 4: The Czech Republic’s  Score in the CP  
Year The Czech Republic’s Score in the CPI 
1998 4,8 
1999 4,6 
2000 4,3 
2001 3,9 
2002 3,7 
Source: Transparency International 1998-2002. 
  
Table 5: The Czech Republic’s Ranking in the CPI 
Year 
The Czech Republic’s 
Ranking 
Number of Countries 
Included in the Survey 
1998 37 85 
1999 39 99 
2000 42 90 
2001 
47-49  
(together with Bulgaria and 
Croatia) 
91 
2002 
52 
(together with Latvia, Morocco, 
Slovak Republic and 
Sri Lanka) 
102 
Source: Transparency International 1998-2002. 
 
The data displayed in the surveys by Czech research institutes also reveal a high level of 
corruption. For example, according to the survey carried out by the marketing research 
institute GfK Prague for TI in 1999, 26 per cent of respondents regarded corruption as 
“necessary part of life” and 24 per cent of respondents said they had been requested a 
bribe by state officials in the last three years (GfK 1999). State offices are the main 
locus of corruption in the CR. Although there has recently been some improvement in 
this area, according to another public opinion survey by GfK, the offices are most 
affected by corruption (see Table 6).  
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 Table 6: Percentage of Respondents Believing Corruption to “be most widespread” in: 
Area 1998 2001 
Health Care 15 13 
Police 10 14 
Judiciary 15 14 
Offices 31 20 
Source: GfK 2001.  
 
Figure 4: Average Grading of Areas of Public Life according to their Penetration by 
Corruption 
0 0,5 1 1,5 2 2,5 3 3,5 4 4,5
Political Parties
Ministries and Central Offices
Banks and Financial Institutions
Police
Army
Courts
Counties
Media
Health Care
Municipalities
Education
Source: Data from Center for Public Opinion Research 2001. Author's presentation of the data.
 
 
According to a survey by the Center for Public Opinion Research, political parties are 
perceived to be far more corrupted than ministries and central offices (see Figure 4). 
Figure 4 depicts the results of a survey that was conducted between 2nd and 4th April 
2001 on a representative sample of 1033 respondents at the age of 15 or older. The 
question the respondents had to answer was: “Which of the following institutions 
and areas of public life are according to you affected by corruption. Evaluate 
according to the [Czech] school grading system, with ‘one’ equal to ‘no 
corruption’ and ‘five’ to ‘high corruption’.” 
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VI. 2. Corruption in Politics: Selected Issues of Party Funding11 
In 1997 scandals related to party finance brought down the governmental coalition (see 
Box 3). In response to the scandals the Czech political landscape underwent a major 
change and in the subsequent elections (1998) the social democrats scored victory with a 
program that put fight against corruption on top of the political agenda. The government 
adopted an anticorruption strategy in 1999; however, the available evidence does not 
prove that it was successfully implemented (see also subsection VII.1). According to 
expert knowledge as well as according to some surveys of public opinion, one of the 
areas that have been most strongly penetrated by corruption has been party finance 
(see Figure 4). Therefore, the report pays special attention to this component of political 
corruption.  
 
Box 3: The Financial Scandals at the End of the 1990s 
The first big scandal related to party finance in the CR emerged before the 1996 elections 
to the Chamber of Deputies. Several exotic donations were reported on the list of the 
donations to the Civic Democratic Party (CDP). These donations were reported under the 
non-existent names of Lajos Bacs from Budapest and Radjiv M. Sindha from the 
Republic Mauritius. Due to these two non-existent sponsors a charge was brought 
against the former deputy chairman of the CDP who was held responsible for dividing 
the sum of money from one donor among several fictive sponsors that resulted in 
estimated tax arrears of almost 1 million CZK. According to the later investigations, the 
money in question was supposedly received by the party from the firm Moravia Steel in 
relation to the public tender for Trinec Metalworks. In fact, this was not a typical case of 
corruption in which a firm would try to “buy” its victory in a tender. The received sum of 
money was paid in order to “persuade” the CDP to support in government a major state 
subsidy for the mitigation of environmental damages in Trinec Metalworks. The subsidy 
constituted a necessary condition for the profitability of Moravia Steel’s investment into 
the company. Unsurprisingly, this interpretation of the scandal remained contested. 
In 1997 another major scandal seriously affected the CDP. This scandal ultimately led to 
the fall of the second Klaus government, a split within the party and the establishment of 
a new political subject – the Union of Freedom – which was largely formed by those 
party members who did not accept the rather lukewarm approach of the CDP’s 
leadership to the allegations brought against the party in relation to the scandal. 
According to these allegations the party was using a secret bank account in Switzerland 
in order to channel donations from firms that did not want to be official donors of the 
party. In addition, the account was supposedly used by the firms that were taking part in 
privatization of important corporations. Although this allegation was not proven 
by the later investigations, in 1998 information was released that after a one-year long 
investigation the police was almost sure that the party had been using money coming 
from bank accounts abroad. Nevertheless, thus far the police did not manage to find any 
direct proof. The party denied the police information. The investigation of the whole 
scandal is gradually fading away. In addition, in April 2001 the Chamber of Deputies 
                                                   
11 This section draws on Cisar and Tomas 2003 (forthcoming).  
 
32
 adopted an amendment that freed political parties from the obligation to pay donation 
tax. This amendment virtually discontinued the three-year long investigation of the CDP. 
As a result of the amendment it is impossible to convict the representatives of political 
parties for not paying taxes related to the received donations. 
This box draws on Cisar and Tomas 2003 (forthcoming). The chapter contains a more 
comprehensive overview of scandals of all Czech political parties and scandals’ 
consequences for the later developments in the CR. 
 
According to the valid legal norms, the possible forms of party revenues are: (1) 
reimbursement of election campaign costs; (2) state funding of party’s and movement’s 
activity; (3) membership contributions; (4) donations and inheritance; (5) revenues 
from the rent or sale of party’s and movement’s property; (6) interest on savings; (7) 
revenues from participation in the business of another legal entity whose activities are: 
(a) publishing and printing activities; (b) publishing and promotion activities; (c) 
organizing cultural, social, sport, entertainment, educational and political events; (d) 
production and sale of objects propagating the party program; (8) revenues from 
lotteries and from cultural, social, sport, entertainment, educational and political events; 
(9) loans and credits.  
 
In the CR public funding of political parties constitutes the biggest share of 
political parties’ revenues (see Table 7). Public funding of the Czech political parties 
consists of two parts. First, political parties receive a fixed subsidy and a subsidy 
for every seat in the Lower or Upper Chambers of Parliament won in the elections. 
Second, parties are entitled for reimbursement of their election expenses. 
Therefore, in the election years the share of state funding in the structure of party 
budgets becomes absolutely dominant (see Table 7).  
 
Since 1991 each political party has been obliged to submit an annual financial report 
to the Chamber of Deputies. There was no penalty provision regulating cases of parties’ 
failure to fulfill this obligation. An important amendment introduced in 1994 imposed 
on the parties the obligation to submit their annual financial reports not only to the 
Chamber of Deputies, but also to the Supreme Inspection Office (SIO) which was 
empowered to control the reports and to alert the Chamber of Deputies, the President, 
and the government to the insufficiencies in the reports. However, on the basis of a 
proposal made by a group of 44 Deputies this provision was declared null and void by 
the Constitutional Court in 1995. The Constitutional Court accepted the Deputies’ 
argument that the provision on the right of the SIO to control the financial reports was 
an illegitimate extension of SIO’s constitutional rights, as the SIO was supposed to 
inspect the management of state property. According to the Deputies, political parties 
did not belong to this category. The Constitutional Court accepted their arguments and 
the provision was abolished. In response to the ruling of the Constitutional Court the 
Chamber of Deputies adopted a new amendment that required that the annual 
financial reports of the political parties be publicly accessible. There is an 
important fact related to this amendment (information by Vojtech Simicek in Slonkova 
and Kudera 1998). The original expression that the reports should be “complete and 
true” was limited to the expression that the reports should be “complete”. Thus, since 
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 then parties have been obliged to submit complete, but not necessarily true financial 
reports. Correspondingly, parties could be penalized only in case their reports were not 
complete.  
Table 7: Direct Public Funding 1995-2000 (percentage of the party’s total revenues) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Civic Democratic Party 45,9 73,1 52,7 83,4 67,6 51,9 
Czech Social Democratic Party 22,7 93,4 80,0 94,4 78,9 72,3 
Christian and Democratic Union –  
Czechoslovak People’s Party 
27,8 54,9 44,1 69,0 44,3 40,7 
Union of Freedom - - - 88,6 84,7 76,2 
Civic Democratic Alliance 48,7 46,8 46,4 65,4 80,9 68,1 
Communist Party of Bohemia and 
Moravia 
10,5 52,0 19,7 53,3 21,8 21,5 
Association for Republic –  
Republican Party of Czechoslovakia 
84,9 99,1 97,9 98,0 - - 
Source: Cisar and Tomas 2003. 
 
 
34
 VII. Anticorruption Strategy in the CR since 1998 
VII. 1. General Overview  
Corruption became a major political issue in the CR in 1998, when the country’s 
political system was heavily influenced by a series of party finance scandals. Due to the 
financial scandals in the then ruling Civic Democratic Party (see Box 3) the second 
government of V. Klaus collapsed at the end of 1997 and a new transitory government 
under the leadership of the then governor of the Czech National Bank Tosovsky was 
appointed. Unlike the previous coalition governments, which in the first half of the 
1990s put the issue of corruption into oblivion, the transitory Tosovsky government 
marked corruption in its list of priorities. For example, the government was 
unprecedentally open to cooperation with the NGOs working on corruption.  
 
Corruption became one of the major issues in public debate. In 1998 the intensity of 
public debate on corruption almost doubled. This is demonstrated in Figure 5 that 
displays the frequency of appearance of the word ‘corruption’ in the news of the 
Czech Press Agency (CPA) between 1988 and 2001. Figure 5 is based on a database 
compiled by the author with the help of a computerized search of the official news 
archive of the CPA. The database consists of 2812 news issued between 1988 and 2001 
that contained the word ‘corruption’. Figure 5 displays the frequencies of appearance of 
the word ‘corruption’ for particular years. The frequency is taken as a rough indicator 
of the intensity of public debate on corruption in the CR. The figure shows that 
although the frequencies have gradually been on the rise since the end of the first half of 
the 1990s (and especially in 1996) the major increase came only in 1998. This is 
attributed to the financial scandals of political parties and the subsequent increase of 
attention paid to corruption. Since 1998 corruption has been placed high on the political 
agenda in the CR.   
Figure 5: Frequency of Appearance of the Word ‘Corruption’ in the CPA News Archive  
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Source: Data from the Czech Press Agency. Author's calculation. 
 
 
It is necessary to mention that there were some efforts to put corruption to the agenda 
already in 1997; however, subsequent events related to the big financial scandals in the 
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 then ruling political parties erased these moderate attempts from the public memory. 
Indeed, according to a public opinion survey conducted by GfK in 1999, it was the past 
communist governments together with Klaus’ governments (1992-1997) that mostly 
contributed to the spread of corruption in the country (GfK 1999). A perceived shift in 
the overall political climate was introduced, according to the same survey, by the 
transitory government of Tosovsky (in power in the first half of 1998). This 
anticorruption shift was rhetorically reinforced by the social democrats, who came to 
power after the 1998 parliamentary elections, and who put fighting corruption on top of 
their political agenda. 
 
The government launched the anticorruption campaign „Clean Hands“ intended to 
redress the cases of privatization mismanagement. However, despite several „success 
stories“ the government was unable to mobilize wider social support for its 
anticorruption objectives and in 2000 the campaign faded away without a major social 
impact (see also Reed 2002a: 143). It was the opposition politicians in cooperation with 
civil society groups such as Transparency International, who, by lobbying for the 
adoption of the Law on Free Access to Information (1999), contributed to the 
increasing accountability of public-sector officials. 
 
On February 17, 1999 the government accepted a Governmental Program for 
Curbing Corruption in the CR and set the direction of the anticorruption struggle in 
the CR. The priority goal of the Program was fighting public-sector corruption; in 
particular, corruption of public officials, judges, public prosecutors, policemen, customs 
officers and employees of financial authorities was regarded as the most dangerous form 
of corruption. On February 14, 2001 the government accepted the Report on 
Corruption and on the Fulfillment of the Governmental Program for 
Curbing Corruption in the CR. This Report was followed by another one that was 
accepted by the government on April 17, 2002 (MVCR 1999; 2001; 2002).  
 
Despite its stated goal to fight corruption the government did not manage to 
demonstrate its resolution to carry out the adopted anticorruption strategy. Credible 
commitment on the side of the executive has been perceptibly missing since the 
anticorruption strategy was approved. Institutional measures to make the political 
elite behave in a more transparent way were not even considered. In addition, the 
government itself became compromised due to the way it was dealing with public 
tenders. Between 2000 and 2002 the government acquired an “absolute exemption” 
from the provisions of the Law on Public Contracts that regulates public procurement in 
the CR. The exemption allowed the government to avoid organizing public tenders. As a 
result, there were numerous cases when the contract was assigned to a supposedly 
carefully selected firm, thus leaving the impression of corruption and manipulation. This 
concerned, for example, the construction of the highway D47 that was assigned without 
tender to the consortium Housing & Construction for a price that could at the end exceed 
several times the usual price. In addition, the contract between the state and the 
consortium is highly disadvantageous to the state and raises suspicions about 
corruption. The new government that came to power in 2002 even considered declaring 
the contract null and void (for more, see Spurny 2003).  
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 The government’s attitude to public tenders was the climax of the generally disastrous 
situation in the area of public procurement in the CR. There are several problems related 
to the Law on Public Contracts: (1) it is not a stable legal norm since it has already been 
amended many times; (2) it allows for contradictory interpretations; (3) it allows for too 
many exemptions, especially at the highest levels of public administration; (4) it also 
applies to some private subjects. As a result, the law did not fulfill one of its main 
missions, namely the minimization of corruption opportunities. In addition, the 
implementation and enforcement of the law has remained a far cry from the ideal. 
According to some experts, the main culprit is the Office for the Protection of 
Economic Competition that is unable to monitor for mismanaged cases and to work 
on the effective prevention and a sound methodology of public procurement 
(Transparency International 2002).    
 
VII. 2. ICTs against Corruption: Policy Recommendations for This Area 
From the point of view of the employment of ICTs for curbing public-sector corruption, 
the governmental strategy is characterized by an almost total neglect of ICTs. Thus 
far, a web presentation focused on corruption has been developed on the website of the 
Ministry of Interior and consists of basic governmental documents, the Code of Ethic 
and information on anticorruption strategies abroad. There is also an e-mail contact for 
victims of corruption. This is, however, a rather poor record. The governmental strategy 
of the fight against corruption does not pay any attention to the employment of ICTs for 
curbing public-sector corruption. Therefore, in order to utilize the potential ICTs hold 
for curbing public-sector corruption (see section IV) the following specific measures 
are crucial: 
 
1. In cooperation with the Ministry of Informatics the Ministry of Interior should 
prepare a conception for publicizing all administrative rules, procedures, 
and requirements on the Internet. No area of public administration should 
be characterized by over-regulation and disorganization. Presently, the situation 
in some fields of public administration is highly opaque. This diminishes the 
effectiveness of public administration and creates opportunities for 
corruption. For example, it is not clear what the exact requirements for firm’s 
registration are. This leads to the present situation characterized by a high 
number of applications being not accepted. In addition, it creates an opportunity 
for some attorneys who, when bribed, capitalize on their contacts with the 
commercial courts and are able to get the registration faster. If the exact 
requirements for each commercial court were published on the Internet the 
probability of rejection would be substantially decreased and the opportunity to 
extract bribes from the applicants would no longer exist. 
2. In cooperation with the Ministry of Justice the Ministry of Informatics should 
prepare a pilot project for the employment of an information system similar to the 
above-defined OPEN system (see Box 1) that would be introduced into a 
selected county court. This would introduce a mechanism that could prevent 
unsubstantiated delays of court decisions. The record of every case would be 
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 publicly accessible through the Internet, including the record of names of the 
individuals responsible for concrete decisions.  
3. In cooperation with the Ministry of Informatics the Ministry of Interior should 
prepare a program of training based on international experience and designed 
for policemen and members of specialized anticorruption units that 
operate in the CR. The training should be focused on the possibilities for using 
ICTs in the investigative and monitoring activities of the police and other 
investigative and law enforcement agencies.  
4. In order to utilize the potential ICTs hold for making public procurement 
more transparent, the Ministry of Informatics in cooperation with the Office 
for the Protection of Economic Competition should work out a methodology 
that would allow not only for publicizing biding opportunities on the 
Internet, but also for organizing the tender themselves electronically. 
The present system provides information about public tenders; however, it is not 
possible to organize full-fledged e-tenders. If e-tendering were introduced it 
would enable wider range of interested bidders to take part in tenders and it could 
also challenge the presently entrenched firms which artificially increase prices of 
public contracts.  
5. In order to achieve at least a minimal control over parliamentary lobbying the 
Ministry of Interior should prepare a legal norm on the obligatory registration 
of lobbyists. The list of the registered lobbyists should be made public through the 
Internet. The list should also contain the record of lobby activities of the 
recognized lobbyists.  
6. The Ministry of Interior should prepare an amendment of the relevant legal 
norm that would make the publication of political parties’ annual reports on the 
Internet a compulsory requirement for obtaining public funding. This 
measure should be interrelated with other measures in the field of party finance 
(for specific recommendations, see the next section).  
 
VII. 3. Towards Transparent Party Finance: Recommendations 
According to the WB, in order to make the system of party finance transparent it is 
necessary to introduce a complex set of institutional measures that minimize 
opportunities for party members to get corrupted. The proposed measures are as 
follows (World Bank 2000b: 42): 
  
1. All sources of party funding should be made public and candidates 
should disclose their links to lobbyists and sources of their support, 
both before and after elections. At the first glance, this requirement has 
already been fulfilled in the CR, where donations must be reported in the annual 
financial reports of political parties. However, the imperfect legal regulation 
throughout the 1990s made it possible that parties were not reporting the real 
names of their donors and were splitting donations in order to avoid paying 
donation tax. In 2000 a new amendment defined the formal conditions for 
donations by a single donor exceeding 50 thousand CZK. A written contract in the 
form of a donation note is needed that includes the full identification of both the 
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 donor and the receiving party. There is, however, no regulation that would oblige 
candidates to disclose their links to private companies and other economic 
subjects. This is a highly desirable requirement that, if accompanied by 
making the registration of lobby activities compulsory, would 
contribute to the higher transparency of party finance in the CR. 
Moreover, as the levels of regional and local politics in the CR display a 
particularly high rate of corruption, the obligation of candidates to disclose their 
involvement in the private sector should be made obligatory not only at the 
central, but also at the subnational levels of policy-making. 
2. The use of state resources for political purposes should be banned: 
parties in government should be forbidden to use state funds, postal services, 
cars, computers, or other assets for political purposes. For example, in the last 
election campaign (2002) in the CR the social democratic government organized 
its meetings in all regional centers of the CR. Each summit was followed by a 
press conference, where the amount of governmental spending on meeting the 
needs of the respective region was announced. This should be banned.  
3. The expenditures of political parties should be limited. There are several 
mechanisms to achieve this goal such as allocating free time slots on TV and radio 
in election campaigns, with no additional time allowed, and imposing legal limits 
on parties’ spending, especially as regards election expenses. While the first 
measure exists in the CR, the second one is still missing. 
4. Public funding of political parties should be considered. It is believed 
that public funding limits the room for private interests to “buy influence”. In the 
CR public funding of political parties plays an important role in parties’ budgets. 
In fact, this type of funding constitutes the biggest share of political parties’ 
revenues (see Table 7). Nevertheless, the available evidence has not 
proven that this measure is a self-sufficient mechanism for reducing 
corruption opportunities. Due to its recent history of scandals related to 
party funding the experience of the CR demonstrates that public funding on its 
own cannot ensure a greater transparency of party finance. In order to be effective 
it must be accompanied by related measures in the form of an auditing 
institution that would focus on controlling revenues and expenditures 
of political parties and legal limits put on possible types of private 
donors (see items 5 and 6).  
5. The types of private donors should be limited. While the present 
regulation in the CR outlaws donations from public-sector companies, the 
limitation should be extended so that big firms competing for public contracts are 
forbidden to donate to political parties. 
6. Party funding should be controlled by a well-empowered institution. A 
new independent institution should be designed, or an existing one should be 
empowered, to control party finance. Such an institution was established, for 
example, in Canada, India, Ireland and South Africa. As reported above, an 
attempt to empower the SIO to control the annual financial reports of political 
parties in the CR failed. Nevertheless, when looking at the data in Table 7 it is 
clear that the possibility for involving the SIO in the control of party finance 
should be seriously considered. 
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 7. Increased publicity should be ensured. There is a tremendous potential for 
the use of the Internet in this area. For example, the voting of members of the 
parliament is accessible through the Internet so that every citizen can check how a 
particular Deputy or Senator voted. However, as corruption at the municipal level 
has become a particularly burning problem in the CR, this model should be 
replicated at this level. 
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 VIII. Public Service Corruption, Civil Service Reform and Detection 
Mechanisms in the CR 
VIII. 1. General Overview  
As noted in section IV, the employment of ICTs can bring more transparency into public 
administration and politics. Also, as underscored section III, increased transparency will 
have a tangible effect on corruption only if it is accompanied by measures in two other 
dimensions of anticorruption struggle - minimizing corruption incentives, i.e. 
introducing a stable system of remuneration and career prospects for public servants 
and improving policing, i.e. increasing the probability that corrupt activities will be 
disclosed. In this section the report turns to these dimensions.  
 
One of the most debated problems of the civil service in the CR throughout the 1990s 
was the lack of a law regulating the civil service. The government brought the draft of the 
Law on Civil Service in the Chamber of Deputies only in December 2000. However, as 
the European Commission stated in its 2001 Regular Report on the Czech Republic’s 
Progress towards Accession, a consensus on the civil service reform was not sufficient in 
the Czech Parliament. According to the Commission, “in view of the key importance of 
this Act, this is regrettable…The adoption of the Civil Service Act remains a precondition 
for establishing an independent, professional, stable and accountable public 
administration. The previous Regular Report identified the absence of this Act as 
impacting negatively on the effectiveness of the public administration, in particular by 
encouraging short-term political appointments and by preventing the establishment of 
attractive career prospects.” (European Commission 2001: 17) 
 
Ultimately, the Law on Civil Service was adopted by the Chamber of Deputies in March 
2002. The second chamber of the Parliament – the Senate - followed suit a month later. 
The text of the new law was made public in the official edition of the Law Codex on May 
28, 2002. As the law introduces a new system of civil service, there is a considerable 
time left for the preparation of its coming to force in the beginning of 2004. According to 
the information provided by the Ministry of Interior, the goal of the new law was to 
improve the integrity of civil servants in the CR and introduce a system of 
stable career prospects and long-term expectations for civil servants, 
accompanied by legal limits put on servants’ involvement in the private sector 
activities and a set of sanctions for breeching the law. In addition, according to 
the original proposal of the law the salaries of civil servants were to increase by 40 
per cent. According to the Ministry of Interior, the expected increase on the basis of the 
final version of the law will be approximately 30 per cent. 
 
Although an increase in public servants’ salaries is often perceived as an important 
measure for minimizing corruption incentives among civil servants the available 
evidence does not prove the validity of this argument. The results of cross-
country comparisons are highly inconclusive: there is no empirically proven link 
between the level of public-sector salaries and the public-sector corruption rate (see Box 
4). The inconsistency of the results indicates that one needs to take into account also 
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 some other contextual variables such as the character of the institutions, the policy-
making process and the political culture in a given country if he is to explain the results 
of particular anticorruption policies. Left on their own, higher salaries cannot 
achieve anything. To introduce high salaries in the public sector of a country that does 
not posses functioning institutions equals to creating additional room for corruption, as 
the officials empowered to decide on who will be working in the generously paid civil 
service will be generously bribed. Therefore, in order to make this measure effective it is 
necessary to consider tightening the control mechanisms designed to detect 
corrupt civil servants. In this case, it is not some unidentifiable “anticorruption 
potential” of high salaries but the simple fear of losing a well-paid position and career 
prospects that prevents civil servants from engaging in corrupt behavior (see also Cisar 
2002a). 
 
Box 4: Do Lower Salaries Lead to Higher Levels of Corruption? 
There is a widely held belief that relatively higher salaries of civil servants contribute to 
lower rates of public-sector corruption. According to this belief the inadequacy of public- 
sector salaries significantly contributes to corrupt behavior. In line with this 
argumentation, Singapore is regarded as a model example of the employment of an 
anticorruption strategy based on fair salary structures and strict penalties. However, the 
available evidence concerning the relation between the salaries of civil servants and the 
rates of public-sector corruption is mixed. Findings from cross-country comparisons are 
inconclusive, depending on the wage data and corruption data used, on the countries 
that are included in the analysis, and on the methodology. There is a measurement error 
in the corruption ratings as well as in the pay data. Corruption ratings do not evaluate 
the civil service only, but rather public-sector corruption in a broader sense, including 
legislative and judicial corruption. Moreover, there are limitations of data on public 
employee payment (e.g. omission of in-kind benefits and allowances, deferred benefits 
such as pensions, job security) that make it less comparable across nations. These 
measurement problems make it more difficult to empirically detect a link between pay 
and corruption. 
Nevertheless, according to the findings of some studies, higher salaries of civil servants 
positively correlate with lower rates of corruption. According to one study, low 
corruption in Sweden during the 1870-1970 period should be partly attributed to the fact 
that high-level administrators were earning up to 15 times higher salaries than an 
average industrial worker. The World Bank’s World Development Report 1997 
demonstrated that countries with poorly paid civil servants tended towards higher rates 
of corruption. These findings were supported also by some other studies. However, some 
studies found no relationship between the level of corruption and the salaries of civil 
servants. What is more, there is a study that indicates more severe corruption where pay 
relative to per capita income is higher. 
In addition, as the World Bank’s web page focused on the problem says, “even if a 
consensus were to emerge that pay did (or did not) influence corruption, the direction of 
causality would be difficult to establish. If corruption takes the form of waiving fees or 
taxes, or increasing procurement costs, there will be fewer public resources available to 
compensate public officials. Corruption could lead to lower pay, rather than the reverse. 
(There is even reason to expect that under certain circumstances higher pay might 
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 actually worsen corruption. At a given employment level, higher pay may crowd out 
other funding necessary for provision of services, increasing bribe-seeking opportunities 
by lengthening queues.)” All in all, “theory does not predict that higher pay will always 
reduce corruption, and this may account for the weak cross-country links between 
them.” 
This box draws on Wei 2000 and the WB’s website devoted to the civil service reform: 
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/civilservice/ineffectivemon.htm#top 
 
The first step towards the introduction of a stable and professional civil service has been 
made in the CR. Although there are many critics of the new Law on Civil Service, it holds 
a promise for the future in the form of predictable long-term career prospects 
and relatively well-paid jobs for civil servants. In addition, in order to ensure the 
integrity of civil servants there are plans to tighten the monitoring and detection 
mechanisms aimed at discovering corruption in the civil service. The Ministry 
of Interior was assigned by the government to consider the employment of the 
mechanism of “direct provocation”, i.e. the deliberate offer of a bribe to a civil servant in 
order to test her integrity. According to the latest version of the proposal for the use of 
provocation, the tool should be used only in exceptional cases; for example, when there 
is a substantiated suspicion or when an official is in a position where she decides about 
the distribution of huge amounts of money. Moreover, the result of the test should not 
have direct legal consequences, i.e. in case someone accepts an offered bribe, he should 
lose his job, but should not be prosecuted (see Kedron 2003). However, according to the 
critiques of the proposal, this is exactly its weak point. While corrupt officials discovered 
by the police are prosecuted, officials disclosed through the test of integrity should only 
lose their jobs. Therefore, according to some experts, provocation makes sense only 
as a part of prosecution.  
 
There are specialized anticorruption agencies operating in the CR (for a detailed 
description, see Reed 2002a: 147-150; 156-158). There is the Department for 
Revealing Corruption and Serious Economic Criminality that has so far 
suffered from the lack of institutional independence and the lack of independence from 
politicians. According to some accounts, the police also “established a special 
department (“Department 15”) in 2001 with the task of investigating possible crimes 
committed by influential Czech political personalities” (ibid.: 156). Further, in 1996 a 
Financial Analytical Unit was established at the Ministry of Finance to control 
transactions characterized as suspicious by financial institutions.   
 
Strengthened control mechanisms and strict penalty provisions should 
become important components of any successful anticorruption strategy. 
However, equal emphasis should be put on prevention. There are several possible 
elements of a strategy for successful prevention of administrative corruption. The very 
fact that civil servants are aware of the control mechanisms serves as a 
powerful tool of the anticorruption effort. It can also be facilitated by the 
introduction of an ethical code of the civil servant. However, such an ethical code must 
be accompanied by a proper enforcement mechanism. If there is no such mechanism, 
the ethical code turns into a rhetoric device without any real-world relevance.  
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VIII. 2. Civil Service Reform and Detection Mechanisms: Recommendations 
for This Area 
1. In cooperation with the Police Directorate the Ministry of Interior should 
prepare a method for police investigation focused on cases of great political 
corruption. The goal of this recommendation is to increase the probability of 
disclosure of corrupt politicians at the central as well as municipal levels.   
2. The Ministry of Interior should prepare a proposal that would ensure that 
those ministerial departments and areas of public administration that 
are vulnerable to corrupt activities (e.g. customs, departments that organize 
big public tenders, traffic police) are regularly exposed to audits of their internal 
procedures by monitoring and law enforcement agencies.   
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 IX. The Role of Civil Society and the Media in the Anticorruption Effort 
IX. 1. Civil Society Groups 
One of the most emphasized dimensions of the anticorruption struggle is the 
strengthening of civil society participation. Civil society groups are expected to 
contribute to (1) the raising of public awareness about corruption; (2) the promotion of 
action plans to fight corruption; and (3) the monitoring of government’s and public 
administration’s actions and decisions (World Bank 2000b: 45). In addition, civil society 
groups often gather and publicize information that is utilizable by state agencies and in 
some cases, civil society groups themselves engage in lobbying deputies and officials in 
order to influence the policy-making process so that new anticorruption measures are 
introduced and enforced.12 Some researchers in the field of curbing corruption believe 
that increased civil society participation will ultimately lead to the reinvigoration of the 
fight against corruption. In other words, civil society organizations are believed to be 
able to break the cycle of corrupted exchanges that would otherwise never come to 
an end. As the most typical cases of corruption do not produce ‘victims’ but establish 
links of mutual complicity through which resources are channeled and distributed (see 
Figures 1 and 2), it is not unproblematic to imagine how such a system could be made 
more transparent. As a response to that problem, public control exercised by interested 
civil society organizations is believed to produce sufficient pressure to bring this type of 
exchange to a halt. 
 
Two types of civil society organizations are distinguished: (1) groups that take a 
collaborative stance to some state offices and try to cooperate with the responsive parts 
of the public administration in order to formulate and promote action plans to fight 
corruption; (2) groups that engage in more confrontational strategies and, instead for 
cooperation, opt for a direct challenge to those whom they regard as corrupt (see, for 
example, Fric 2002). Both types of civil society organizations operate in the CR. The 
most visible organization of the first type is the Czech chapter of Transparency 
International (TI) which has established links to the political system of the country 
and is often listed by state officials as the single most important civil society organization 
focusing on curbing corruption.13 The Prague-based association Regeneration 
represents the second type here. One of the activities of the association is the direct 
monitoring of conflict-of-interest cases involving deputies of Prague municipal 
assemblies and employees of Prague municipal offices.  
 
The subsequent paragraphs focus on the activities of TI, Regeneration and some other 
relevant NGOs in the CR. Box 5 presents a case study of the role of the media in 
                                                   
12 For general overviews of and contributions to the recent debate on the role of social movements, NGOs 
and other civil society organizations in politics, see Melucci 1996; della Porta and Diani 1999; Giugni et al. 
1998; Aminzade et al. 2001; Hardt and Negri 2001.  
13 The last Report on Corruption and on the Fulfillment of the Governmental Program for Curbing 
Corruption in the CR prepared by the Ministry of Interior and accepted by the government on April 17, 
2002 devotes considerable attention to the activities of TI. 
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 awareness raising about corruption. On the basis of the assessment of the present 
situation the report concludes with a set of recommendations.  
 
IX. 2. Strategies of Transparency International in the CR14 
The national chapter of TI was founded in June 1998. As the Czech Republic was the 
only East European country, where in 1998 there was still no national chapter of TI, 
there was a strong interest by the Berlin headquarters to move into the CR, too (for 
general information on TI, see Galtung 2000; Wang and Rosenau 2001). Thus, 
international pressure was the first important condition for TI’s establishment in the CR. 
The second one was that the problem of corruption started to be perceived as a real one 
within the country itself. This obviously facilitated the establishment of an organization 
claiming curbing corruption to be its main objective. According to the perception of the 
activists themselves, besides these two reasons, there was a third, equally important, 
one. It was the fall of Klaus’ government at the end of 1997 that opened the theretofore 
closed institutional points of access and also contributed to the change in the country’s 
political culture. The anticorruption program of TI overlapped with the reinvigorated 
effort of the government to fight corruption (see also subsection VII.1).  
 
After the Czech chapter of TI was established, it engaged in practices of networking and 
coalition building. TI’s aim has been to create multi-sectoral coalitions that would 
provide it with sufficient social and material support generated through the network ties, 
and with points of institutional access to the country’s political system. As TI does not 
resemble a network of devoted activists, its networking activities seemingly target 
categories of political players that in some cases differ from the targets of other non-
governmental organizations: “TI enlists the energies of leaders of corporations, national 
governments, NGOs, and international agencies. It works hard at forming links among 
these elites and is not particularly concerned about including activists who do not hold 
top organizational positions.” (Wang and Rosenau 2001: 39) The Czech chapter to an 
extent proves this observation, although this does not exhaustively describe all strategies 
and objectives of the organization. 
 
The Czech chapter’s possible cluster of organizations with which it may establish links 
includes actors from all social spheres – from civil society, state, and, increasingly, also 
from the business sector. First, there are non-governmental organizations such as 
the EastWest Institute; the International Institute for Marketing, Communication and 
Entrepreneurship; the Center for Community Organizing; and recently also 
Regeneration. Some environmental NGOs have been contacted, but successful 
cooperation has not developed. In addition, TI cooperates with some other NGOs when 
it is in need of some specific services (e.g. legal consultancy). 
 
The most important TI’s partners are definitely the state-based actors. The TI’s 
first field of interactions with the local context was in the state and governmental offices. 
                                                   
14 The bulk of information in this section was collected from repeated interviews with TI’s project manager, 
David Ondracka. I am grateful to David Ondracka for his cooperation.   
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 According to a co-founder of TI in the CR, “in 1998 we started to present TI to the 
political representatives. We contacted a lot of people here, advisers to the president, 
people from the legislative department of the presidential office, officials in the 
governmental office. We also tried to contact the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate; 
however, they were too busy at that time.” (Clough 2001) The Ministry of Interior, the 
Ministry of Justice, and the police are among the important partners of TI. People from 
state offices are members of TI’s executive board. In general, public administrators and 
politicians alike are willing to cooperate with TI. There is also some cooperation with the 
parliament. The Committee of the Senate on Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Security 
established a Subcommittee for the Fight against Corruption. Some of the members of 
this subcommittee have established lasting links with TI and they consult with it on the 
relevant issues. 
 
This brings us to another category of TI’s partners and links, namely individual 
politicians. In 1998-99 there was an important collaboration between TI and the 
politicians who prepared the Law on Free Access to Information (the law was adopted in 
1999). TI organized a seminar, a happening, and it also directly lobbied the Deputies and 
the Senators. In cooperation with the EastWest Institute TI addressed the Senators and 
the Deputies and the campaign was highly successful, as 25 per cent of them replied back 
and confirmed their support for the draft law. After the adoption of the law TI organized 
an information campaign among the population. There was also some cooperation with 
the Chair of the Senate. 
 
TI also cooperates with the academicians; one of them is involved in TI’s campaign 
against corruption in the police structures. Further, a new project was set up in 2001 
focused on coalition building in the business community (firms are required to 
subscribe to a Code of Ethics and behave accordingly), and TI intends to bring together 
these firms with the representatives of environmental NGOs. Although this particular 
project has not yet been completed and there are numerous problems related to the 
cooperation with the business community TI intends not only to cooperate with diverse 
actors, but also plans to serve as a locus for the cooperation of actors from different 
social sectors.  
 
However, the main TI’s partners are to be found within the ministries, other state offices 
and big firms more than within the sector of citizens’ activists. On the other hand, it does 
not follow that TI resists cooperation with other NGOs; rather, it carefully weights the 
expected benefits and costs of such cooperation, as it turned out that the close links with 
certain NGOs could close TI’s access to some ministries. As a result of this focus, the 
organization seems to be ‘well equipped’ to secure for itself necessary access to the 
political system and respond to the developments there. However, this is at the cost of 
diminished ‘mobilizing potential’ in the NGO sector.  
 
Most recently, TI started a new project aimed at fighting corruption at the regional 
level. Also, TI focused on corruption among the councilors, deputies and civil servants 
of the Prague City Hall. This reinvigorated the previously rather lukewarm 
cooperation with Regeneration (see also below). On the basis of the regional round-
table on Corruption-Free Town Halls in the Visegrad 4 Region, which took place 
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 between February 7 and 9, 2003 in Prague, TI presented an extensive list of 
recommendations with the intention to make the Prague City Hall more transparent 
and accountable to the citizens (Transparency International 2003b). Last but not least, 
TI is presently completing a project whose aim is to publish on the Internet the exact 
requirements for firm’s registration by commercial courts (for more, see section IV).  
  
Box 5: TI and the Role of the Media – An Example of Awareness 
Raising 
According to its own perception, TI definitely contributed to the fact that corruption 
became an important political issue in the CR at the end of the 1990s. This was partly 
due to the most visible TI’s instrument of public awareness raising, namely the 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The media, when reporting about the results of the 
popular CPI, always devote substantial attention to other issues related to corruption, 
thus contributing to establishing the issue as an important problem. As a result, TI 
brokers information that becomes a resource in political struggles. The importance of 
TI’s function as an information broker became clear in 2001 when the information it 
provided facilitated an intense political clash between the political elite and the country’s 
leading investigative weekly Respekt. 
In TI’s 2001 CPI report the CR was ranked as the 47-49th out of 91 listed countries (see 
Table 5 above). This would not say much if the CPI did not provide an opportunity to 
compare the listed countries to each other and in time (see Tables 4 and 5 above). From 
this point of view the CR fared worse than in 2000 and it was followed by Colombia in 
the 2001 ranking. The information was released and offered to others to use it according 
to their own interest. In its regular Monday’s issue on 22 October 2001, Respekt 
published an article criticizing the government of the social democrats for creating 
corruption climate in the country. According to Respekt, 
“[i]n Czechia public interest challenged corruption and three years ago brought 
Milos Zeman to the prime minister’s chair. However, his government lost the fight 
against corruption as it is demonstrated by the data of Transparency International, 
as well as by the corrupted behavior of ministers starting from Brezina, the 
youngest one, and finishing with Gregr, the oldest one.” (Holub 2001a) 
The government challenged the weekly’s interpretation of the governmental 
anticorruption campaign and promised to bring the case to the court with the intention 
to completely destroy Respekt by asking for an enormous monetary compensation. 
According to the prime minister, the ministers felt deeply offended and Respekt should 
have been already destroyed anyway. Finally, there was an opportunity to achieve this 
goal. The ensuing confrontation between the weekly and the government brought into 
the debate a number of various actors from the CR and from abroad. Due to the prime 
minister’s declaration, the whole conflict acquired a ‘freedom of speech’ framing. It was 
claimed that a democratic politician should not utter sentences like these. However, as 
the confrontation moved on, the debate also invited people directly involved in the 
corruption field to propose new strategies for curbing corruption in the CR. For 
example, the chair of TI’s executive board and at that time director of the Czech 
Statistical Office utilized this opportunity to advertise TI’s institutional innovation for 
minimizing corruption opportunities in the case of public procurement - the so-called 
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 integrity islands. 
While TI was continuing its routine work, the issue of corruption was taken up by 
Respekt which took pains to present on its pages the available evidence supporting the 
claim that the social democratic government was indeed corrupted (see, for example, 
Holub 2001b; c). The problem of corruption received increased publicity, although the 
case Respekt vs. the government gradually withered away. However, the whole affair 
definitely affected the public arena. First, the conflict coincided with the official 
anticorruption campaign and in fact made it rather ineffective. Second, it questioned the 
integrity of the government that claimed the fight against corruption one of its main 
objectives. 
 
IX. 3. Other NGOs: Coalition “SOS Prague”, Regeneration, and the 
Environmental Law Service 
The project “SOS Prague” started in 1998 as a coalition of professional environmental 
NGOs and local associations of Prague citizens and focused on conflict-of-interest cases 
involving deputies from municipal assemblies in Prague and employees of municipal 
offices.15 Since its establishment the coalition has been ‘detecting’ conflict-of-interest 
cases and has been trying to subvert municipal decisions that were in conflict with the 
public interest. According to one participant in the project, it turned out that almost all 
decisions made by Prague municipalities have been affected by conflict of 
interest. According to the same account, big construction companies finance some 
political parties in Prague. In turn, these companies regularly receive huge public 
contracts. The informant stressed that this was not even a matter of manipulated public 
procurement, as there was virtually nothing public involved in the whole 
process. Supposedly, regardless of the public interest, projects are designed 
so that interested people and/or political parties profit from them. The direct 
evidence is naturally missing; however, the available evidence also proves the generally 
disastrous situation in the field of public procurement. For example, a recently released 
report by an audit institution that focused on the department of the city investor of the 
Prague City Hall discovered a number of problems in the tenders organized by the 
department (Value Added 2002).  
 
The NGO called Reconstruction provided the coalition SOS Prague with public 
relations services and necessary expertise in the field of corruption.16 Based on the 
experience of SOS Prague a bigger project called “Conflict of Interest and Politics in 
the Public Administration” has developed. The goal of this three-year long project is 
to prepare a set of policy recommendations that will be submitted to committees of the 
Chamber of Deputies. In order to be able to better lobby for its goals Reconstruction 
moved to a building that is located just in front of the building of the Chamber of 
Deputies. Lobbying in the Parliament will be a rather novel component in the 
organization’s strategic repertoire. Thus far, Reconstruction has mainly been focusing on 
the level of municipal (Prague) politics and in order to challenge the detected conflict-of-
                                                   
15 For more comprehensive information, see http://www.sospraha.cz. 
16 For more comprehensive information, see http://greenways.cz. 
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 interest cases it usually opted for a direct confrontation with the suspected deputies. 
Most importantly, the organization developed a database to monitor the involvement 
of the deputies of the central Prague assembly in private firms and 
published it on the Internet (see Reconstruction 2002). 
 
Yet another important NGO that got involved in an important case relevant to 
corruption and the quality of public governance in the CR is called the Environmental 
Law Service (ELS). According to its 2000 Annual Report, the organization is a public 
interest law organization that focuses on promoting the public interest. According to the 
ELS, the type of public interest that needs the most intensive legal protection is “the 
defense of the environment and human rights, especially where such defense involves 
public participation in decision making, public monitoring of state administrative 
authorities, and citizens’ access to justice.” (ELS 2001: 3) 
 
In 2001 the ELS got involved in the case of the new Civil Proceedings Code which 
threatened to circumscribe the rights of some parties to administrative proceedings on 
the territory of the CR. The Civil Proceedings Code is the basic legal norm that regulates 
all administrative procedures in the CR. The main reason for the preparation of the new 
norm was the perception that the old one that was adopted in 1967 has become outdated. 
The Czech government brought the draft of the new Civil Proceedings Code in the 
Chamber of Deputies in September 2001. 
 
Already at the time of drafting of the law the ELS voiced its objections to it. Due to the 
use of the Internet by the author of the law - the Ministry of Interior - the ELS could 
keep track of the developments of the draft law and offer comments. Although the 
organization never got an official reply from the Ministry, the ELS’s comments were 
supposedly deemed the most thorough contribution to the debate on the draft law. The 
most important criticism addressed to the draft law pointed out that as a result of a new 
definition of the status of parties involved in administrative proceedings, it limited the 
room for the public to participate in these proceeding on an equal footing. Under the 
original regulation, every party involved in a proceeding possesses the same rights. 
Regardless of whether a particular party is a multinational corporation or an owner of a 
small garden, everyone has the same procedural rights. 
 
The new draft law proposed to give to the civil servants the discretion to decide on the 
scope of the rights of involved parties. As a result, the rights of some parties could be 
circumscribed and, in addition, such a regulation would prepare the ground for 
corruption, as it would be the judgment of a particular official that would ultimately 
determine the rights of interested parties. The ELS criticized the inequality introduced 
by the draft law and its potential to create new corruption opportunities. In order 
to prevent the adoption of the law, the EPS lobbied the Deputies and participated in the 
meetings of the relevant parliamentary committee. Although the government made two 
consecutive attempts to push the draft law through the Chamber of Deputies, it 
ultimately failed. 
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 IX. 4. NGOs and the Use of ICTs: Recommendations for This Area 
All the described NGOs use information technologies in order to promote their 
goals. The most visible way they use them is the development of web presentations that 
in some cases offer really valuable information not only on their activities, but also on 
the fight against corruption in general. TI maintains the most developed web 
presentation. Its website provides diverse and rich information and links to all types of 
resources relevant to corruption throughout the world. Besides the links, there are 
descriptions of TI’s projects, summaries of several research projects focused on the 
corruption climate in the CR and other East European countries, results of TI’s most 
visible research projects such as the CPI and the Bribe Payer Index (BPI), monitoring of 
the press, and discussion forums on selected problems. Therefore, TI’s website serves as 
a particularly suitable starting point for everyone interested in corruption and related 
issues. Until recently the most striking feature that characterized TI’s website was the 
lack of links to other Czech NGOs dealing with corruption.  
 
The earlier version of the report concluded: the activities of NGOs in the field of 
anticorruption struggle in the CR are marked by an excessive lack of cooperation and 
information exchange. Although it cannot be expected that those NGOs that opt for more 
confrontational strategies will be willing to cooperate with those organizations that try to 
cooperate with state agencies, the present situation significantly undermines the 
potential inherent in a more robust information exchange between interested actors. 
There is no need to establish strong cooperative ties. It would not be possible and, 
moreover, it could erase the diversity of approaches to corruption.17 Different 
organizations have developed their own organizational autonomy and they want to 
preserve it in the future. However, even under these conditions the combination and 
exchange of diverse expertise could facilitate the efforts of involved organizations. The 
core of the problem is to find a form of cooperation that would enable participants to 
preserve their autonomy, their genuine goals and characteristic strategies and yet, be 
able to link them through what could be called ‘weak ties’ (on the concept of ‘weak ties, 
see Granowetter 1992).  
 
Therefore, the earlier version of the report recommended: a common 
information server should be established. The establishment of the server focused on the 
fight against corruption would not only facilitate information exchange among the NGOs 
active in this field, thus promoting their genuine goals, but would also improve 
communication between the NGO sector and the media and between the NGO sector 
and the state. The quality of communication between NGOs and journalists is not always 
the best. Sometimes, the activists are ‘cited’ in a newspaper without being actually 
contacted by it. Sometimes, the issue of corruption is overtaken by totally inexperienced 
journalists whose media products remain a far cry from the standards of the profession. 
The establishment of a server, which would include regularly updated information for 
journalists, would significantly improve the quality of public debate on the issue of 
                                                   
17 On the importance of the diversity of the representations of public good and the disagreement over 
them, see Gutman and Thompson 1996; Stark and Bruszt 1998; Macedo 1999. For a somewhat different 
view, see Habermas 1996. 
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 corruption in the CR. The server would also contribute to the de-monopolization of the 
anticorruption effort by providing high quality information on corruption and the 
activities of the NGOs fighting it to the interested state actors. Thus far, only TI managed 
to find a way to the Ministry of Interior that is responsible for the formulation of the 
state anticorruption strategy. However, it would be exaggerated to talk about a 
coordinated cooperation between TI and the ministry. Their cooperation remains 
sketchy, unsystematic and superficial. Therefore, the establishment and the 
maintenance of the server could improve this situation and provide the officials with a 
wider range of relevant information. All in all, the establishment of the server would 
enable various actors to obtain information about the activities of other actors. This is a 
strategy that fully utilizes the potential of ICTs and aims at a decentralized model of 
corruption control. 
 
The situation has started to change since the second half of 2002. In the beginning of 
2003 TI’s website provided new links to the local projects of other NGOs and 
researchers working on corruption. It was possible to promptly find recent reports 
on corruption and anticorruption in the CR and elsewhere in Eastern Europe 
published by the EU Accession Monitoring Program - EUMAP (for the CR, see Reed 
2002a; 2002b). Also, it was possible to immediately link to the website “Conflict of 
Interest” that offers the available results of Regeneration’s project on the conflict 
of interest of the deputies of the central Prague assembly. Most importantly, 
there is the database of the involvement of the deputies in private firms (see above 
and Reconstruction 2002). According to TI, the improvement of cooperation does not 
concern only the virtual space of the Internet, but it also characterizes the real-world 
relationships between the organizations.  
 
In order to facilitate the activities of the NGOs working on corruption: 
 
1. The recently reinvigorated cooperation between the organizations working on 
corruption should continue.  
2. As the policy of openness and responsiveness to the relevant state offices has not 
yet brought any tangible results in terms of the substantially diminished 
levels of corruption in the CR, all anticorruption NGOs should take a 
relatively tougher stance on corruption. Within the confines of the 
valid legal norms the corrupt politicians and bureaucrats should be 
directly confronted.  
3. TI should take a more active stance in the anticorruption campaign. Based on 
the experience of other national chapters of TI (e.g. Bulgaria) it should employ the 
strategy of direct monitoring of big governmental deals (public tenders). 
In addition, the recent auctions of private sector’s debts by the Czech 
Consolidation Agency provide an opportunity for the active involvement in the 
anticorruption struggle.  
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 X. Where You Can Learn More 
For general overviews of the recent situation in the field of corruption in the CR and 
other accession countries, see the reports on corruption published by the EU Accession 
Monitoring Program: http://www.eumap.org/reports/2002/content/50. Additional 
information on corruption can be found on the websites of Transparency International. 
If you are in need of general literature on corruption you can use the website of TI’s 
headquarters: www.transparency.org. If you need country specific information go to the 
website of a country you are interested in. For example, the Czech chapter’s link is 
www.transparency.cz. Further, the World Bank Anticorruption Knowledge Center 
provides rich and comprehensive information on many aspects of corruption at 
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/. For the recent developments of 
the information policy in the CR, see the website of the Czech Ministry of Information  
http://www.uvis.cz/. There is no specialized on-line information source on the use of 
ICTs in the anticorruption struggle. There are printed publications that touch upon the 
problem on the very general level. See, for example, Richard Heeks, ed. Reinventing 
Government in the Information Age: International Practice in IT-enabled Public Sector 
Reform. London: Routledge, 2001.  
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